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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines three topics in macroeconomics. The first chapter studies the
impact of severance payments on employment when firms can subcontract as a substitute
for hiring workers. In countries with strict job security regulations firms use flexible
sta ng arrangements to bu er the regular workforce from economic fluctuations and avoid
workers’ firing costs. I set up a general equilibrium model in the tradition of Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993) where firms can hire two types of workers: subcontractors that are
totally flexible, and permanent workers that entail firing costs that increase with seniority
in the job. Both types are perfect substitutes in production, but permanent workers
are relatively less expensive as subcontractors’ charges are higher than the firm’s own
production costs. I estimate the model using a simulated method of moments by fitting
employment growth dynamics of Chilean manufacturing plants. I find that allowing firms
to subcontract workers increases output, employment and productivity. This e ect is
stronger on output as subcontracted workers allow firms to respond more aggressively to
productivity shocks, which enhances the allocation of labor across firms and hence total
factor productivity (TFP). When firms can subcontract, the negative e ects of firing costs
are less than previously estimated in the literature.
The second chapter analyzes the e ects of capital adjustment costs on quantity dynamics
and asset prices in a real business cycle model when the representative agent has Epstein-
vi
Zin preferences. Capital adjustment costs make it costly for agents to smooth fluctuations
in consumption through the production sector, inducing them to take more consumption
risk. I show this model accounts for the main statistical features of macroeconomic ag-
gregate quantities. At the same time, adjustment costs increase the equity risk premium,
with the mean stock return and its standard deviation in the order of magnitude consis-
tent with the data. The model also produces a stable risk-free rate, and comes close to
matching its average return.
Finally, the third chapter (with Shuheng Lin) empirically examines the contribution of
firm-level idiosyncratic shocks to aggregate fluctuations in the US, Germany, Canada,
and the UK. We find shocks to large firms are of little relevance in the UK or Canada,
but roughly explain one third of output fluctuations in the US and Germany. We argue
the ability of the largest firms to transmit shocks is not universal, even when the firm size
distribution is highly skewed as the theory suggests (Gabaix, 2011).
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Chapter 1
Firing Costs, Subcontracting and Employment Dynamics
1.1 Introduction
In many countries labor markets are constraint by strict legislations that protect workers
against arbitrary actions, and give them higher job stability in the face of adverse economic
conditions.1 Even though these regulations are necessary in some cases, they also increase
labor adjustment costs and impose heavy constraints to the firms that want to adjust their
workforce in response to economic fluctuations. As a result, firms are increasingly turning
to flexible sta ng arrangements with less stringent rules, particularly with regard to firing
costs. These contracts allow firms to bu er the stock of permanent workers, and overcome
the potential costs associated with employment regulations during o -peak periods. As
firms’ use of contingent workers widespread, it is important to explicitly take into account
this margin of adjustment for firms to properly evaluate the impact of firing costs. This
paper provides a basic framework to perform such analysis.
A variety of evidence has pointed to a significant growth of flexible sta ng arrangements,
in particular, with regard to subcontracting. Subcontracting is a form of temporary em-
ployment in which a firm (‘main firm’) sublets to a third party (‘subcontract firm’) the
performance of tasks or works, complete or partially, with its own dependent employees.
When firms subcontract tasks to other firms, the employer of record for the worker per-
forming the task changes, and the responsibility for all employment liabilities is trespassed
to the subcontract firm. This way the firm avoids potential costs of dismissal and gains
1Legislation on employment protection usually regulates unfair dismissals, dismissals for economic
reasons, mandatory severance payments, the use of fixed-term contracts, and minimum advance notice
period in case of impending dismissal.
2flexibility to terminate workers’ contracts at will. But why then firms don’t subcontract
their entire workforce to circumvent firing costs? The hypothesis explored in this paper
is that subcontractors’ charges are higher than the firm’s own production costs. Recog-
nizing this, firms still hire permanent workers even when subcontracted workers do not
entail firing costs.
Chile provides a particularly interesting setting to investigate the combine e ects of firing
costs and subcontracted workers. For many years, the country carried out asymmetric
labor market reforms introducing a two-tier system: on the one hand, supporting job
security provisions that greatly penalized employers for firing workers by imposing siz-
able tenure-dependent severance payments and, on the other, maintaining the market for
subcontracted workers practically deregulated. This policy sustained a high employment
protection legislation gap between both types of workers for years, triggering a widespread
use of subcontracted workers, and a reallocation away from permanent workers.2
For many people, these arrangements are a politically viable way of achieving labor mar-
ket flexibility when faced to important opposition from “insiders” (permanent workers).
In this sense, they argue that keeping a proportion of low firing costs workers allows firms
to regain flexibility to adjust their workforce, increasing their profits and the firms’ value.
In fact, we observe there is a positive relationship between the share of subcontracted
workers and the establishments’ sales volatility (see Figure 1.1). Establishments with
more volatile sales, need to adjust labor more frequently and are more constraint by the
costs of firing workers. These plants, therefore, employ subcontracted workers in a larger
proportion.3 For others, these developments have only lead to a dramatic reduction in
2A recent survey of employment conditions conducted by the Labor Directorate in Chile (ENCLA for
its initials in Spanish) indicates subcontracting has widespread as a form of flexible employment in Chile:
25% of the firms use subcontracted for their main activities, while 38% declare to have subcontracted
as least one service during 2011. The survey also shows that increasing number of workers is engaged
in subcontracted employment relationships, and that the firm where and/or for whom they work no
longer directly hires them: in 2011, 3 out 10 workers per firm were subcontracted, while 1 out of 10 was
subcontracted for activities regarded as central to the business function.
3Micco and Pages (2006); Cingano et al. (2010) and Haltiwanger et al. (2014) find that employment
3subcontracted workers’ job stability, and an impoverishment in their working conditions.
Indeed, permanent employment fluctuations are smoother and less frequent than fluctu-
ations in subcontracted workers. As observed in Figure 1.2, a large proportion of plants
that report mild or no changes in permanent employment per year coexists with many
more plants adjusting subcontracted employment sharply.4
Figure 1.1: Establishments Sales’ Volatility and Share of Subcontracting
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Note: Only plants that use subcontracting are considered.
Notes: the figure shows the average share of subcontracted workers in an establishment by decile of sales
volatility. Source: ENIA.
The simultaneous use of strong job security provisions for full-time workers with per-
manent contracts, and lax regulation on subcontracted workers is clearly contradictory,
and raises important questions regarding the combined e ect of both instruments on em-
ployment, and the desirability of such a policy from a normative perspective. In spite of
these concerns, very little is known about the impact of severance payments on aggregate
outcomes when firms circumvent the regulation using subcontracting as a substitute for
protection regulation is more binding in sectors exposed to higher volatility in demand/supply shocks or,
similarly, with larger reallocation rates.
4For subcontracted employment, “exits” (git = ≠2) and “entries” (git = +2) do not necessarily cor-
respond to plants that e ectively entered or exit the market as is the case with permanent employment.
These are also plants that start using subcontracted workers this period after not having employed any
the previous period (entry), and plants that fired all their subcontracted workers after having employed
some the previous period (exit). Further, these periods of sharp adjustment are usually followed by long
periods of inaction.
4Figure 1.2: Distribution of Employment Growth Rate
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Subcontracted Employment
Notes: the figure represents the fraction of plants expanding (contracting) at di erent growth rate intervals
(as measured in the horizontal axis). Growth rate is computed according to the standard Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992) definitions: git = (xit≠xit≠1)/(0.5ú(xit+xit≠1)), where xit is the number of employees
(subcontracted or permanent) in plant i at time t. The bars to the right of the origin correspond to job
creation and to the left to job destruction. At the center, the proportion of plants for which employment
remains unchanged, and exits (entries) correspond to the left (right) endpoint. Source: ENIA.
hiring workers. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this discussion from a theoretical
and empirical perspective.
To address these issues, I set up a general equilibrium model in the tradition of Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993) with heterogeneous firms and endogenous entry and exit, where firms
can hire two types of workers: subcontractors that are totally flexible, and permanent
workers that entail tenure dependent firing costs. Since increasing current employment
determines firms’ future firing costs, the existence of firing costs transforms the firms’
problem into a non-trivial intertemporal one. Both types are perfect substitutes in pro-
duction, but permanent workers are relatively less expensive as subcontractors’ charges
are higher than the firm’s own production costs. Hence, firms can either hire full-time
permanent workers and bear the potential adjustment costs in case of dismissal, or af-
ford to pay a wage premium on subcontracted workers and benefit from the flexibility of
terminating their contracts at zero cost. When subcontractors’ charges are large enough
and all permanent workers are subject to firing costs, the employment protection system
5studied in this paper reduces exactly to the separation tax regime analyzed by Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993).
For the estimation, I set the model in partial equilibrium and use the Annual National
Manufacturing Survey (ENIA for its initials in Spanish) conducted by the National In-
stitute of Statistics of Chile (INE), which contains detailed information on subcontracted
workers for more than 10,000 plants over the span of seven years. Since the model has no
closed-form solution I use a simulated method of moments, and optimally choose the pa-
rameters to reproduce a set of moments that combine time-series employment dynamics,
and cross-sectional industry characteristics. By studying permanent and subcontracted
employment dynamics, I am able to measure the costs of adjusting permanent workers,
and the wage premium on subcontracted workers firms are willing to pay to substitute
for permanent workers. The importance of incorporating subcontracted workers becomes
clear when comparing the di erent estimations performed. Finally, I embed my estimated
model in a general equilibrium framework to quantify the costs of the regulation, and the
potential benefits of removing it. Also, I measure the gains from subcontracting as a
substitute for hiring workers when firms face strict job security regulations.
To anticipate my results, I find that severance payments in the manufacturing sector
in Chile are equivalent to seven months’ wages, and that workers get tenure after 4
years in the job. Further, firms are willing to pay a wage premium of 10 percent on
subcontracted workers to substitute for hiring workers, and be able to bu er the regular
workforce from economic fluctuations avoiding workers’ firing costs. A naive researcher
wanting to estimate firing costs in Chilean manufacturing plants without noticing that
firms subcontract to substitute for hiring workers, would conclude that firing costs are
substantially lower in the economy (i.e. between one and four months’ wages), and that
on average workers get tenure after approximately 3 year on the job.
The main finding of the paper is that allowing firms to subcontract workers in a heavily
6regulated environment increases output, employment and productivity. To overcome the
potential costs associated with dismissing permanent workers, firms subcontract as a sub-
stitute for hiring workers to bu er the regular workforce from economic fluctuations. This
way firms smooth out permanent employment fluctuations at the expense of an increase
in subcontracted employment volatility. Provided subcontractors’ charges are small rel-
ative to adjusting inside workers, subcontracting workers is an attractive alternative for
the firms to cover peak demand or productivity shocks. When firms can subcontract
they respond more aggressively to productivity shocks, which enhances the allocation of
labor across firms and hence total factor productivity (TFP). In this context, the neg-
ative e ects of firing costs on aggregate outcomes are less than previously estimated in
the literature. If the government decided to eliminate firing costs instead of allowing
subcontracting to introduce flexibility to the labor market, the increase in productivity
and output of this policy would be even stronger. However, such a policy would eliminate
subcontracted workers, being permanent workers the big winners of the change.
Related literature This paper is related to the literature that evaluates the impact of
job security provisions on labor markets performance, and productivity. Several models
predict that employment protection raises the costs of workforce adjustments, distorting
the e cient allocation of labor as firms retain unproductive workers, and divert from
hiring workers whose productivity exceeds their market wage, ultimately a ecting pro-
ductivity growth.5 Another line of research is more empirical, and looks at the impact
of job security provisions on aggregate outcomes and employment dynamics. In line with
the theoretical literature, there is much of a consensus regarding the impact of firing
costs on job flows (both job creation and job destruction decrease) and productivity (also
decrease), though the implications for employment are less clear.6 When targeting em-
5See, among others, Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993),
Bartelsman et al. (2004), Samaniego (2006), and Poschke (2009).
6For instance, for studies on the e ects on job flows see Micco and Pages (2006), Cingano et al. (2010),
and Haltiwanger et al. (2014); on productivity see Autor et al. (2007), Bassanini et al. (2009) and van
7ployment protection on a specific group of workers or type of contract, several studies find
that the legislation actually induces substitutions across groups or type of contracts.7
Few papers have studied the impact of firing costs on aggregate outcomes when firms
can use flexible sta ng arrangements to substitute away from permanent workers. The
majority of the studies available have concentrated on the e ect of temporary contracts
within a partial equilibrium setting, and usually justify the use of temporary contracts
exogenously; either imposing that all the new jobs are temporary, or modeling them
as an exemption of the firing costs and forcing firms to open permanent positions.8 In
my paper, I set up a general equilibrium model and endogenously explain the choice
between permanent and temporary workers. The approach is consistent with the labor
regulation in Chile, in which subcontracted workers entail no costs of dismissal, but
subcontracts’ charges are higher than the firm’s own production costs. In this setting,
the choice of permanent and subcontracted workers can be easily understood as the trade-
o  between firms hiring full-time permanent workers and bearing the potential adjustment
costs in case of dismissal, or paying a wage premium on subcontracted workers and gaining
flexibility to terminate their contracts at zero cost. Subcontracted workers in this setting
are substitutes to permanent workers.
The studies closet in spirit to mine are Alonso-Borrego et al. (2004), Veracierto (2007)
and Alvarez and Veracierto (2012); the three studies perform a general equilibrium anal-
ysis of severance payments and temporary contracts with search frictions. While the first
Schaik and van de Klundert (2013); and on the e ects on employment see Lazear (1990),Heckman and
Pagés (2000),Boeri et al. (2000),Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) and Ljungqvist (2002) for a theoretical
discussion on how the results on employment crucially depend on model assumptions. Several studies
evaluate the e ect of firing costs exploiting labor reforms as a source of exogenous variations. See, for
example, Miles (2000),Autor et al. (2004), and Kugler and Pica (2008).
7See, for instance, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Fernández-Kranz and Rodriguez Planas (2011), Boeri
(2011), Boeri and van Ours (2013), and Pierre and Scarpetta (2013).
8For models in partial equilibrium see, for instance, the labor demand model of Bentolila and Saint-
Paul (1992), and Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014), the model of job creation and destruction of
Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997), and the matching model of Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002). While the
relative consensus in this literature is that temporary contracts increase job turnover and employment
volatility, the e ects on aggregate employment remain in partial equilibrium and are less clear.
8evaluates the quantitative e ects of the labor regulation in the presence of contractual
and reallocation frictions, the last two studies assume complete markets. Alvarez and
Veracierto (2012) extends an island model with indirect search to study tenure depen-
dent firing costs. In their framework they can analyze firing taxes as in Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993) and temporary contracts as special cases. In a similar setting, Veracierto
(2007) analyzes the short-term e ects of introducing flexibility in the labor market which
di er quite substantially from the long-run e ects. All the three papers find that labor
reforms that introduce temporary contracts increase allow firms to respond more ag-
gressively to economic fluctuations, which enhances the allocation of labor and increases
productivity. While they also produce an increase unemployment, the e ects on welfare
tend to be positive.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the institutional
setting of the labor market in Chile, the data and some stylized facts. Section 1.3 de-
scribes the model economy, defines the equilibrium concept, and presents the calibration
for the fixed parameters. Section 1.4 describes the simulated method of moments for
the estimation, and discusses the selection of moments. Section 1.5 shows the estima-
tion results for di erent specifications of the benchmark model. Section 1.6 presents the
results for the policy experiments in the general equilibrium framework, followed by the
conclusion in section 1.7. The Appendix outlines the solution algorithm.
1.2 Motivating Evidence
In this section, I first briefly explain the process of reform of the employment protection
legislation (EPL) over the past decades, and describe the regulatory framework regarding
full-time and subcontracted workers. Then, I present the data used in the analysis, and
some stylized facts regarding the dynamics of permanent and subcontracted workers in
9Chile.
1.2.1 Institutional background and the origins of a dual labor market
For the past three decades Chile has carried out asymmetric labor market reforms in-
troducing a two-tier system; on the one hand, encouraging job security provisions that
greatly penalized employers for firing full-time workers by imposing sizable tenure de-
pendent severance payments and other restrictions to the firing process; on the other,
maintaining the market for subcontracted workers practically deregulated.
The current institutional framework dates back to 1980 with the approval of the Labor
Code by the military junta in the midst of an unprecedented liberalization process that
had at its center the labor market. The aim of this new law was to increase labor market
flexibility and eliminate labor market distortions, while still providing some minimum
degree of job security to the workers.9 In the early 1990s, with the reestablishment of a
democratic government, the tables turned and the e orts to further the liberalization of
the labor market unwound. Gradually, the employment protection legislation regarding
full-time workers became more restrictive with major reforms occurring during the 1990s
and 2000s. Subcontracted workers’ lack of influence to lobby policy makers, and probably
their still incipient use during this period resulted, instead, in the upholding of lax job
security protection for almost three decades.
The labor law regarding full-time workers mandates a minimum period of advance notice
in case of impending dismissal, the causes considered as justified reasons for dismissals,
and the compensation to hired workers in case of dismissal for unjustified reasons. Firms
are required to notify workers in case of impending dismissal with at least one month in
advance, and in case of termination for unjustified reasons they are entitled to one monthly
9Since their inception, job security provisions were intended to favor permanent workers over subcon-
tracting, part-time, fixed-term, or any other kind of temporary contractual relationship.
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wage per year of service with a maximum of eleven months. Until 1980 there was no upper
limit to severance payments, and the new law of 1980 established an upper limit of five
months; in 1990, this upper limit was raised again from five to eleven month wages. Since
then there has been no change in the regulation regarding severance payments in Chile.10
Permanent workers have contracts of indefinite duration and cannot be fired without cause
even if severance are paid. Causes for just or unjust dismissal were modified in several
occasions during this period, in particular, in relation to economic and financial needs
being just reasons for dismissal. The Labor Code of 1980 established that economic and
financial needs, as well as serious misconduct such as criminal behavior or absenteeism
were justified reasons for dismissals. In 1984, firms’ economic or financial needs were
excluded as justified causes for dismissal, restoring these workers’ rights to severance
payments. Further, the first democratic government in 1990 reclassified firms’ economic
and financial needs as just causes, but workers dismissed for these reasons were liable to
severance pay. In case of dispute, severance would be paid with a 20 percent surcharge
in the amount of the compensation if the firm failed to prove just cause. In 2001, the
penalty for firms that fail to prove just cause on court was severely increased; it raised
from an equivalent of 20 percent, to a range that goes from 30 to 100 percent surcharge
in the amount of the severance.11
The extent of these reforms can be appreciated in Figure 1.3 by means of the “job security”
index.12 This index measures in monthly wages the expected cost of dismissing a full-
time indefinite worker at the time of hiring, and it utilizes information on compulsory
10According to Bentolila et al. (2012), severance pay for permanent workers dismissed for economic
reasons in France are equivalent to 6 days of wages per year of service plus 4 days if seniority is higher
than 10 years. In Spain, severance pay is equivalent to 20 days per year of service for workers dismissed
for economic reasons. Unfair dismissals in Spain raise the severance pay to 45 days per year of service.
11See Edwards and Edwards (2000) for a complete description of the reforms to the labor market
regulation from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. For a description on more recent reforms, see [complete]
12This index was constructed by Heckman and Pagés (2000) for 24 countries in OECD and Latin
America, and subsequently updated for Chile from 1960-1996 by Montenegro and Pagés (2005) , and from
1996-2005 by Alvarez and Fuentes (2011).
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advance notice periods, and compensations for dismissals. Given that the workers have
the right to contest dismissals, the index also includes a measure of the likelihood that a
firm’s dismissal cause is considered unjust in court. After several years of low employment
protection (late 1970s and beginning 1980s), job security more than doubled in the mid-
1980s to continue trending up during the 1990s and 2000s. According to this index, firing
costs in Chile are back to around 3 months’ wages.
Figure 1.3: Index of Employment Protection in Chile: 1960-2005
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Notes: the “job security” index measures in monthly wages the expected cost of dismissing a full-time
indefinite worker at the time the worker is hired. The index was constructed by Heckman and Pagés
(2000) for 24 countries in OECD and Latin America, and subsequently updated for Chile from 1960-1996
by Montenegro and Pagés (2005), and from 1996-2005 by Alvarez and Fuentes (2011).
In the meantime, regulation on subcontracted workers was kept isolated from the counter-
reform process of the 1990s and 2000s. Towards the late-1970s the use of subcontracted
workers was completely liberalized, extending their use to any activity inside the firm, and
eliminating all the restrictions preventing firms from subcontracting activities regarded as
central to the business function, and periodic machine maintenance (a key component of
the production process at that time).13 In addition, the requirement to provide the same
working conditions, salaries and social benefits to permanent and subcontracted workers
13See Decree Law No. 2, 200 of 1978, and Decree Law No. 2, 759 of 1979.
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was eliminated. The law also prohibited subcontracted workers to join a union in the
user firm with the full-time workers under the rationale that their legal employer is the
subcontract firm.14
It was not until October 2006 that subcontracted work was regulated in Chile for the first
time in large detail (Law No. 20, 123). The subcontracting law (or “anti-subcontracting
law” as has been known) changed the existing subsidiary responsibility of the user firm
into a joint responsibility shared with the subcontractors. This means that both parties
become jointly responsible for compliance with labor obligations, and in the case of injuries
and fatalities to their workforce. The responsibility lies with the subcontractor, but the
law also placed labor responsibilities on the user firm. On the other hand, the user
firm has the right to require certifications of compliance with these obligations by the
subcontractor, and may refuse to pay any amounts due in case of non-compliance.15
1.2.1.1 Enforcement of the Law
The extent to which the legal regulation is implemented and enforced plays a key role
in terms of how it e ectively applies to the firms. In this sense, the degree to which
countries have the proper institutions to enforce the regulation determines the “true”
rigidity of the labor laws. In Chile, the Labor Directorate (DT) has been historically
the exclusive government body that enforces all labor, social security, and health and
safety laws. This institution has the authority to enforce the labor law through di erent
mechanism, among which the three most important are: policing, which means inspectors
can visit workplaces at any time, with or without a preceding charge made by an employee
14The only protection that remained from the previous regulation was the subsidiary responsibility of
the user firms in relation to their subcontractors’ labor practices. This means the user firm is responsible
for compliance with these obligations only after it is not possible to sue the subcontract firm. Law No.
16, 757 of 1968 regulated subcontracting before these modifications.
15A controversial issue was the fact the law did not limit the possibility of subcontracting tasks that are
central to business function, and that it did not reinstate the requirement of providing the same working
conditions, salaries and social benefits to permanent and subcontracted workers.
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against the employer. They can also inspect physical premises or business records. If
inspectors find that an employer has violated a labor law, they can fine the employer,
order the suspension of working activities, or even close the workplace; administrative
interpretation of the law (dictamen), which means they have the faculty to determine
the meaning and scope of the labor legislation; and file a complaint in the labor courts
in matters which it does not have authority (i.e. “unfair labor practices”, violations of
“fundamental rights” or “disloyal” actions against employees.)
From an international perspective, Chile has a rather strict enforcement of the regulation.
Following the approach in Caballero et al. (2013), I proxy the level of enforcement of
the labor regulation using Kaufmann et al. (2010) indicators of rule of law, government
e ciency, and control of corruption. I assume countries with an e ective government,
stronger rule of law, and lower levels of corruption are more likely to have the ability
to enforce the existing labor regulation. According to these measures, Chile ranks well
above the average of Latin American countries, and about the mean of OECD countries
in terms of the three di erent measures (See Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Enforcement of the Labor Law: International Comparison
Government Rule of Control of
e ciency law corruption
(rank percentile, 2012)
Chile 87 88 91
Latin America 58 51 57
OECD 87 87 85
US 90 91 89
Best practice 100 100 100
Notes: the table shows Kaufmann et al. (2010) indicators of rule
of law, government e ciency, and control of corruption. The data
is reported in percentile rank, ranging from 0 (lowest rank) to 100
(highest rank).
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1.2.2 Firm-level Data
The empirical analysis in the paper is performed using a panel of plant-level survey
data from the Annual National Industrial Survey (hereinafter referred to by its Spanish
acronym, “ENIA”) collected by the National Institute of Statistics of Chile (INE). The
survey encompasses all manufacturing establishments with at least 10 or more workers,
and is updated annually incorporating all those plants that begin operating during the
year plus the continuing plants, and excludes plants that stop operating or reduced their
hiring below the survey’s threshold. Each plant has a unique identification number which
allows identification of entry and exit, and the computation of plant-level time-series.
The dataset is available for the period 1996 to 2011, but panel-data information for
subcontracted work is only available from 2001 through 2007.16 Plant-year observations
are dropped if permanent employment is either zero or missing. I also excluded the
tobacco industry and petroleum refineries from the analysis because they are organized
as monopolies, operating with very few plants. This generates a sample of 10,906 plants
and 69,938 observations with mean (median) employees of 72 (27). To ensure a reasonable
sample size I run the estimation on the full panel, ignoring for now the specific industry
to which the plants belong.
For each plant and year, the census collects detailed information on total number of em-
ployees, separated by the contractual relationship between the plant and the employee.
Employers can hire workers under a permanent or full-time contract, or subcontract to
a third party the performance of a certain task or work with their own independent
employees. The survey also reports plants’ use of subcontracted workers in 6 di erent
occupations: engineer and drafting services, blue-collar production, production assis-
tant (i.e.machine maintenance, storage and transportation services), accounting services,
16Starting from 2008, the National Institute of Statistics ceased to release the plant unique identification
number necessary to match the plants abandoning the panel-structure. Before 2001 the classification to
register subcontracted worker was dramatically di erent so I also drop that information.
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blue-collar non-production (i.e. janitorial and secretarial services), and salesperson on
commission.
1.2.3 Stylized Facts
The e ect of the employment protection gap between permanent and subcontracted work-
ers can be appreciated by looking at Figure 1.4, where I present the evolution of subcon-
tracted workers in Chile. Between 1996 and 2007, plants’ use of subcontracted workers
skyrocketed in Chile; in 2007, 12 percent of the plants use subcontracted workers (up
from 3 percent in 1996), while among the plants that use subcontracted workers, around
3 out 10 workers per plant were subcontracted (up from 1 out of 10 in 1996).
Figure 1.4: Evolution of Subcontracted Work in Chile
Notes: the figures show the percentage of total workforce by year (on the left) and the share of subcon-
tracted workers as a percentage of total workforce by plant (on the right). Source: ENIA.
It is interesting to note that even when this modality of employment initially emerged
in routine and low skilled occupations such as janitorial and security services, now it is
present in key value-adding functions, such as logistics and accounting services, and high-
skilled production-related occupations such as engineer and drafting services. Between
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2001 and 2007, plants subcontracted on average 25 workers out of every 100, where
blue-collar production workers, and engineer and drafting services were the occupations
that gathered the largest number of subcontracted workers (See Table 1.2). During this
period, these were also the occupations that experienced the largest increase (see Figure
1.5). This echoes the fact that the form subcontracted work adopted in Chile is not the
“specialized” one, where establishments subcontract skills they lack for their business.
Instead, plants in Chile subcontract activities regarded as central to the business function,
and subcontractors works in the premisses of the main firm, with machinery, inputs and
raw materials also provided by the main firms.
Table 1.2: Share of Subcontracted Workers by Occupation
Average
2001-2007
Engineering & drafting services 4.6
Accounting services 2.7
Salesperson (on commission) 4.0
Janitorial & secretarial services 2.8
Blue-collar production 7.4
Machine maintenance, storing & transport 3.2
Total 24.7
Notes: the table reports the share of subcontracted workers by occu-
pation as percentage over total workforce by plant. The figures are
computed averaging across the N plants and then over the T periods.
In practice, when firms subcontract tasks or services to other firms, the employer of record
for the worker performing the task changes, and the responsibility for all employment
liabilities is trespassed to the subcontract firm. The client firm becomes the de facto
employer of the worker, though the subcontract firm remains as its de jure employer
(i.e. signs the labor contract and agrees on the wage to be paid). The subcontract firm
then “lends” the worker to the client firm, which in turn charges a cost for the provided
service. In this sense, the client firm gains flexibility to terminate workers’ contracts at
will, as it can proceed without indicating reasons, nor comply with the minimum period
17
Figure 1.5: Subcontracted Work by Occupation in Chile
Note: the figures show the total number of subcontracted workers by occupation (on the left) and the
share of subcontracted workers as a percentage of the plant’s workforce by occupation (on the right).
Source: ENIA.
of advance notice or pay firing costs. One of the biggest advantages of these employment
arrangements is that subcontracted workers are under the managerial authority of the
client firm, but on the payroll of the firms that supplies them.
1.3 Description of the Model
In this section I introduce the model for the estimation which is an industry equilibrium
model in the tradition of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) with heterogenous firms and
endogenous entry and exit, modified to include tenure dependent firing costs and two
types of workers. For the estimation the model is set in partial equilibrium, and in
Section 1.6, I embed it in a general equilibrium framework to perform the policy analysis.
I start by briefly motivating the elements in the theory. First, firms produce output using
two types of workers: subcontractors that are totally flexible, and permanent workers that
entail firing costs that increase with seniority in the job. Both types are perfect substitutes
in production, but permanent workers are relatively less expensive as subcontractors’
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charges are higher than the firm’s own production costs. Firms decide the division of labor
input between permanent and subcontracted labor as the optimal response to shocks.
Second, there is ample evidence that employment adjustment at the plant level is charac-
terized by periods of sharp adjustment followed by long periods of inactivity, and the case
of Chile is not any di erent.17 Thus, in the model I consider non-convex labor adjustment
costs, in particular, piecewise linear adjustment costs, which can produce inaction and
mimic these facts.
Third, I consider severance payments that increases with seniority in the job as the main
characteristic of the employment protection regulation. In Chile, severance payments
are equivalent to a month’s wage per year of service with a maximum of eleven months.
Instead of keeping track of the distribution of workers across tenure levels and increasing
the dimension of the problem, I assume permanent workers randomly get tenure, and
that only workers with tenure are entitled to severance payments.
Finally, there is a continuum of ex ante identical potential entrants, and selection occurs
upon entry. Once firms enter the market they receive a random idiosyncratic productivity
level, and they operate only if their first productivity draw is above the exit threshold. As
the firm’s productivity changes, it optimally chooses to grow, contract or exit the market.
Since there are no aggregate shocks and the only source of uncertainty in the model is the
firms’ productivity, the distribution of firms over a size-productivity space is constant,
and so all the aggregate variables.
17For evidence for the U.S., see Hamermesh (1989), and Caballero et al. (1997). For evidence for other
countries, see Varejão and Portugal (2007), complete
19
1.3.1 Firms and Technology
There is an industry composed of a continuum of firms that produce an homogenous good.
Firms behave competitively taking prices in the output and labor markets as given. Each
firm operates a decreasing returns to scale, labor-only production function, using both
permanent and subcontracted workers:
yt = f(nt, st, zt) = zt(nt + st)– (1.1)
where nt are the workers with a permanent contract, st the workers with subcontracts,
– œ (0, 1), and zt is the exogenous productivity that takes values in the finite set Z ©
{z, ..., z}. The process for zt follows a First Order Markov Process with transition matrix
 (z, zÕ) and is i.i.d. across firms. This implies there is no uncertainty at the aggregate
level.18
The two types of workers are perfect substitutes in production, but they di er in their
wages and firing costs:
i) Permanent workers are those with contracts of indefinite duration, and entail sever-
ance pay in case of dismissal. Permanent workers earn wage w. To avoid increasing
the dimension of the problem and keeping track of the distribution of workers across
tenure levels, I assume permanent workers have (1≠⁄) probability of getting tenure,
and only workers with tenure receive severance payments in case of dismissal. Work-
ers with a permanent contract fired before tenure do not accrue severance pay.
Thus, workers with a permanent contract evolve:
nt = lt≠1 + ot (1.2)
18These disturbances could also reflect shocks on the demand side, where firm produce di erentiated
goods and the distribution of consumer tastes across this di erentiated goods is stochastic over time. See
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) for a more detailed description of this alternative structure.
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where lt≠1 is the number of permanent workers with tenure employed last period,
and ot is the number of workers hired or fired in t. The law of motion for permanent
workers with tenure is:
lt =
Y_]_[lt≠1 + (1≠ ⁄)ot, if ot > 0lt≠1 + ot, if ot Æ 0. (1.3)
Since the optimal decision of current employment depends on the number of perma-
nent workers last period, lt≠1 is a state variable for the firm.
Firing costs on permanent workers with tenure take a form similar to the work of
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993):
g(lt, lt≠1) = max {0, · (lt≠1 ≠ lt)} (1.4)
where · is the fixed payment for every permanent worker laid-o . In principle,
labor adjustment costs can consider the search, recruiting and training cost of hiring
workers, but since the interest falls on the e ect of severance payments I choose to
ignore hiring costs for now. This specification for labor adjustment costs imply the
marginal cost of changing employment is constant; hence, when the gains to changing
the number of workers is small firms optimally choose not to adjust–marginal costs
of adjustment do not go to zero as the size of the adjustment goes to zero, and
there is no reason for the firms to smooth adjustment. In this setting, firms’ labor
adjustments are characterized by episodes of sharp adjustment followed by periods
of optimal inactivity.
ii) Subcontracted workers are those with temporary contracts subject to no costs for
laying them o . In turn, they are relatively more expensive than permanent workers
as subcontractors’ charges are higher than the firm’s own production costs. Firms can
employ subcontracted workers for occasional or seasonal purposes, or jobs for absent,
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as well as jobs for carrying out a specific task or service for a determined period of time
related to the production process. The subcontract firm legally employs the worker
(signs the contract and pays the wage w), which in turn works on the premises of the
user firm who pays a fee per worker to the subcontract firm.19 Hence, subcontracted
workers earn ws = w(1 + f), where f is the fee or wage premium on subcontracted
labor. Provided the cost of subcontracting workers is small relative to the cost of
adjusting in-house workers [1≠ ·(1≠⁄)], contracting out is an attractive alternative
for the firms to cover peak demand or productivity shocks.20
The operative profits of an active plant are given by
pyt ≠ wnt ≠ wsst ≠ pcf ≠ g(lt, lt≠1) (1.5)
The timing of the model for incumbents is as follows:
1. Enter period t with last period’s shock zt≠1 and permanent workers with tenure lt≠1
2. Decide whether to exit. If the firm exits, pays the adjustment costs g(0, lt≠1) for
firing all workers from last period, and receives zero profits in all future periods
avoiding to pay cf .21
3. If the firm stays, it pays ptcf and receives this period’s shock, zt
4. Firm chooses labor demand and the number of workers to hire under each type of
19Subcontracted workers may be restricted by law or mutual agreements between firms and unions, so
that firms are obliged to hire a certain amount of employees on a permanent basis. For example, it could
be assumed that the ratio between permanent and subcontracted workers can never fall below a minimum
threshold Â¯. To remain faithful to the regulatory framework in Chile for the period under study, I assume
no restrictions on subcontracted labor and no hiring cost.
20The premium over subcontracted workers could also be justified on the basis of a compensation
subcontracted workers demand to work on the firm considering their higher expected probability of losing
the job.
21Fixed operating costs make the exit decision meaningful; plants exit to avoid paying the fixed cost
instead of simply waiting for a better realization of z and bearing an output of zero.
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contract.
The timing for a potential entrant:
1. Pay the one-time entry cost ptce and then draw a productivity level zt from ‹(z0)
(which is independent across firms)
2. Decide whether to stay in the industry. If the first productivity draw is above the
exit threshold the firm stays and produces as in 4 above.
1.3.2 Static Subproblem of the Firm
For any plant with z œ Z the optimal level of subcontracting solves the following static
problem:
P (n, s, z) = max
s
{pz(n+ s)– ≠ n≠ wss≠ pcf}
st : s Ø 0
(1.6)
Note that the wage rate for permanent employees has been normalized w = 1, hence does
not appear explicitly in the expression.
The solution implies that the optimal subcontracted labor choice is:
s(n, z) =
Y_]_[
1
–pz
ws
2 1
1≠– ≠ n, if –pzn–≠1 > ws
0, if –pzn–≠1 < ws
(1.7)
Then, evaluating the profit function P (n, s, z) at the optimal subcontracted labor decision
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s(n, z), the operating profit of the plant R(n, z) is:
R(n, z) © P (n, s(n, z), z) =
Y_]_[
1
1≠–
–
2 1
–pz
w–s
2 1
1≠– + n(ws ≠ 1)≠ pcf , if –pzn–≠1 > ws
pzn– ≠ n≠ pcf , if –pzn–≠1 < ws.
(1.8)
1.3.3 Dynamic Optimization
Given that all uncertainty is idiosyncratic, I study a stationary equilibrium where pt =
p. In this equilibrium, firm undergo change over time, with some of them growing or
contracting, even exiting the market and others starting up. Since there are no aggregate
shocks, despite all these changes the distribution of firms over a size-productivity space
is constant, and so all the aggregate variables.
1.3.3.1 Incumbent Firms
The dynamic programming problem of an incumbent plant that employed lt≠1 permanent
workers last period, decided to remain in the industry this current period, and received
the new value for its shock zt is described by the Bellman equation:
V (lt≠1, zt; p) = max
n
)
R(nt, zt; p)≠ g(lt, lt≠1) + —max[Ezt+1V (lt, zt+1; p),≠g(0, lt)]
*
,
(1.9)
subject to equation (1.2) and (1.3), and labor adjustment costs as defined in equation
(1.4).
Ezt+1 denotes the expectation of zt+1 conditional on the current value of productivity
zt, and — is the discount factor. The value V (lt≠1, zt; p) is the expected discounted
stream of profits from operating a plant with productivity zt and previous employment
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level lt≠1. Given that the firm does not receive any new information between the cur-
rent decision point and the time of the exit decision at the beginning of next period, it
chooses now whether to exit tomorrow. Conditional on this period’s employment deci-
sion, the firm stays if the exit cost, ≠g(0, lt), is larger than the expected value of staying,
Ezt+1V (lt, zt+1; p).
In this framework, there are two decisions of an incumbent firm: i) optimal composition
of total employment nt = L(lt≠1, zt; p), and st = S(nt, zt; p), and ii) optimal exit decision
next period xt+1 = X(lt, zt; p) œ {0, 1} with convention that X = 1 corresponds to exit
and X = 0 to stay.
1.3.3.2 Entry Decision
The decision whether to open a plant is also dynamic. It is profitable to open a new plant
if:
V e(p) =
⁄
V (0, z; p)d‹(z) Æ pce, (1.10)
where the value of of operating a new plant with productivity zt and no previous employ-
ment, lt≠1 = 0, is:
V (0, zt; p) = max
n
)
R(nt, zt; p) + —max[Ezt+1V (lt, zt+1; p),≠g(0, lt)]
*
. (1.11)
subject to equation (1.3), (1.2) and labor adjustment costs as in equation (1.4).
That is, new plants are open as long as the discounted expected profits from operating
a new plant are enough to cover the entry costs. In equilibrium with positive entry, the
entry of new plants induces changes in the output price and the firm value until there are
no gains from entering this industry, and the constraint is satisfied with equality.
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1.3.4 Stationary Distribution
In this model the state of an individual firm is fully described by (z, l), and the state
of the industry in turn is described by the distribution over the state variables for all
firms. Let the incumbent firms at the beginning of the period be summarized by the
measure µ(z, l) (after they have made their exit/stay decision and new realizations of z
have arrived), and the mass of firms that enter be equal to M .
The law of motion for the distribution of firms is given by
µÕ(z, l) =
⁄
zÕ
⁄
z
[1≠X(l, z; p)]F (zÕ/z)dµ(z, l) +
⁄
zÕ
M Õd‹(z) (1.12)
A stationary equilibrium is such that this distribution reproduces itself, i.e. µÕ = µ.
The equilibrium distribution of productivity and permanent employment is determined
by the productivity of entrants, the stochastic process of productivity, the extent of
selection, and the number of entrants. Once the distribution of the state variables has
been determined it is possible to compute all aggregate variables.
Total supply in the industry is:
Qs(µ,M ; p) =
⁄
zú
f(L(l, z; p), S(n, z; p), z)dµ(z, l) +M
⁄
zú
f(L(0, z; p), S(n, z; p), z)d‹(z).
(1.13)
Aggregate demand for this industry follows a standard representation: Qd = D(P )
1.3.5 Definition of Equilibrium
A stationary industry equilibrium with positive entry and exit is a set of value func-
tions and decision rules, a price pú, a stationary distribution of firms µú, and a mass of
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entrants Mú such that:
1. Given prices, the value functions of the firms and the policy functions are consistent
with firms optimization
2. Markets clear: pú = D(Qú) and Qú = Qs(µú, pú, wú)
3. There is an invariant distribution over firms: µú = T (µú,Mú; pú)
4. The free entry condition is satisfied: V e(pú) = púce
Before moving to the estimation of the model I discuss some properties of the policy
function for labor implied by the model. Starting with the model without firing costs (· =
0), subcontracted workers are meaningless in this setting as they are more expensive than
permanent workers, but provide no advantage in terms of firing costs. Hence, firms choose
permanent workers so that their marginal product equates the wage: lt = (–pzt/w)1/(1≠–).
To illustrate the firm optimal behavior, Figure 1.6 simulates the optimal labor decision
of a single plant for 40 years for an arbitrary productivity shock. It is clear that when
productivity this period is high, firms hire permanent workers, while if productivity is
low they dismiss workers; current employment is determined entirely by the current value
of the productivity shock.
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Figure 1.6: Optimal Labor Decision: Model Without Firing Costs
Notes: the figure shows the optimal labor decision of a single plant for 40 years for an arbitrary productivity
shock when permanent workers do not entail firing costs. The parameters are given in Table 1.6 (Panel
B, row 1, model with quick tenure) for · = 0.
When the government introduces a positive firing cost, and no subcontracting is allowed
yet, current employment also depends on last period’s employment. In this setting, the
optimal employment decision for permanent workers with tenure lt(zt, lt≠1) follows:
lt(zt, lt≠1) = lt≠1 if lt≠1 œ
Ë
l(zt), l(zt)
È
lt(zt, lt≠1) = l(zt) if lt≠1 < l(zt)
lt(zt, lt≠1) = l(zt) if lt≠1 > l(zt),
(1.14)
where l(zt) and l(zt) are obtained from the first-order conditions of equation (1.9). Intu-
itively, l(zt) is the largest amount of permanent workers a firm with productivity zt wants
to hire if it does not have to pay firing costs this period (i.e. is a firm that is expanding),
and l(zt) is the smallest amount of workers the firm hires if it has to pay firing costs this
period (i.e. is a firm that is shrinking). For a firm with lt≠1 œ
Ë
l(zt), l(zt)
È
, the gains from
changing the number of workers is too small so they optimally choose not to adjust.
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Figure 1.7 (left panel) illustrates this (s, S) type of rule for all workers with a permanent
contract with quick tenure (⁄ = 0) and slow tenure (⁄ > 0).22 All firms with employment
last period below “l(t) lower bound” hire workers up to this lower bound, while all firms
with employment levels above the “l(t) upper bound” reduce their employment levels
down to this upper bound. Note also that the band is narrower when ⁄ > 0; this is, when
the firm hires permanent workers knowing that with probability (1≠⁄) they will actually
get tenure.23 The same figure, on the right, simulates the optimal labor decision of a single
plant for 40 years for an arbitrary productivity shock with quick tenure (⁄ = 0) and slow
tenure (⁄ > 0). Consistent with the policy function, firms hire permanent workers only
if the productivity shock is large enough, and we observe periods of sharp adjustment
followed by long periods of inactivity. When ⁄ > 0, the fact that not all workers get
tenure gives the firm some flexibility to adjust employment to changes in productivity
more often. Employment becomes more volatile in this case, and firms can use resources
more e ciently.
In the model economy with firing costs and subcontracted workers, firms use subcon-
tracted workers to bu er the stock of permanent workers, and avoid their potential costs
of dismissal during periods of lower productivity. When the firm receives a positive shock,
it responds by increasing the number of subcontracted workers. Only if the shock is large
enough, the firms increases their hiring of permanent workers. In the case of a negative
productivity shock, the firms start by firing as many subcontracted workers as possi-
ble, and when it rans out of subcontracted workers, starts firing permanent workers and
bearing their dismissal costs (see Figure 1.8, right panel). Consistent with this dynamic,
Figure 1.8 (left panel) illustrates the policy function for a firm subject to firing costs
(quick tenure) and with the possibility to subcontract. When firms can subcontract, the
22In the case when ⁄ = 0, nt = lt as there are no workers with permanent contracts that do not entail
firing costs.
23The lower portion of the decision rule is downward slopping because smaller firms need to hire pro-
portionally more permanent workers today to reach the “l(t) lower bound”. Recall that when ⁄ > 0,
nt ”= lt.
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Figure 1.7: Optimal Labor Decision: Model With Firing Costs and No Subcontracting
Notes: the figures illustrate the policy function for all workers with a permanent contract (on the left),
and the optimal labor decision of a single plant for 40 years for an arbitrary productivity shock when
permanent workers entail firing costs (on the right). Two cases are plotted: quick tenure (⁄ = 0) and slow
tenure (⁄ > 0). The parameters are given in Table 1.6 (Panel B, row 3, model with slow tenure).
“inaction band” narrows with respect to the case without subcontracting (compare the
solid line labeled Total with the dashed line labeled Permanent no subcontracting) coming
closer to reach the optimal level of employment without distortions. Hence, the extent
to which resources are not allocated e ciently decreases. Also, the increase in employ-
ment up to the “lower bound”, is attained by a combined increase of subcontracted and
permanent workers. As explained before, firms begin subcontracting workers, and only if
the productivity shock is large enough they increase their hiring of permanent workers.
1.3.6 Solution Method
The model has no closed-form solution hence it is solved numerically. In appendix A.1 I
present a detailed characterization of the computation method used to solve the model.
The model period is one year. I assume firm’s idiosyncratic shocks follow an AR(1)
process of the form:
log zt = µ+ fl log zt≠1 + Át (1.15)
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Figure 1.8: Optimal Labor Decision: Model With Firing Costs and Subcontracting
Notes: the figures illustrate the policy function for all workers with a permanent contract and quick tenure
(on the left), and the optimal labor decision of a single plant for 40 years for an arbitrary productivity shock
when permanent workers entail firing costs and plants can subcontract (on the right). The parameters
are given in Table 1.5 (Panel B, row 3, model with slow tenure).
where µ is a constant, fl the persistence of the shocks, and Át is a random variable with
standard normal distribution. I approximate the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks
using the quadrature-based method developed in Rouwenhorst (1995), which has been
shown to be more reliable in approximating highly persistent processes, and choose the
number of grid points gz = 30. The initial distribution ‹(z0) is chosen to be the stationary
distribution of the z process which matches well the size distribution of the firms age 0-1
years in the data.
Industry demand is given by a decreasing function. For simplicity, take the following
iso-elastic functional form:
p = Q≠
1
÷ , (1.16)
where p is output price, Q is the industry output, and ÷ > 0 is the price elasticity of
demand elasticity.
To discretize the state space for permanent employment I assign a log-linear grid with
size gn = 300. Because permanent employment n is an endogenous variable, I have to
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be careful that the choice of the number of points in the grid does not a ect the results.
Sensitivity analysis indicates the choice was adequate.
1.4 Estimation Method
In this section I propose a simple technique for the estimation of the model based on
simulation, and the selection of moments that summarize key features of the data.
1.4.1 Simulated Method of Moments
Since the model has no analytical closed form solution I use an estimation technique based
on simulation to estimate the parameters of the model. Specifically, the estimation of the
parameters is achieved by simulated method of moments (SMM) (McFadden, 1989; Pakes
and Pollard, 1989; Du e and Singleton, 1993), which minimizes the distance between key
moments from actual data and model-generated moments.
The full set of parameters necessary to compute the model is the vector:
◊ = {—,–, cf , ce, fl, µ,‡Á, ·, f,⁄, ÷} (1.17)
where — is the discount rate, – the curvature of the production function, cf is the fixed
operating costs, ce is the entry cost, fl, µ, and ‡Á are the parameters that define the
idiosyncratic shock, · is the fixed cost the firm must pay for each permanent job de-
stroyed, f is the wage premium on subcontracted workers, ⁄ is the probability that a
permanent workers gets tenure, and ÷ is the price elasticity of demand. From the full set
of parameters, 7 are estimated, and the remaining 3 are predefined.
To perform the SMM estimation a set of statistics of interest  A is selected from the
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actual data for the model to match. For an arbitrary value of ◊, the solution to the
model is used to generate S simulated data sets of size (N,T ), where N is the number
of firms and T is the number of periods.24 The simulated moments  S(◊) are computed
on each data set and then averaged out to compute the minimizing criterion function:
 (◊) = [ A ≠ 1S
qS
s=1 S(◊)]Õ W [ A ≠ 1S
qS
s=1 S(◊)]. I use the same random draw for
the productivity shock throughout each simulation.
The parameter estimate ◊ˆ is obtained by searching over the parameter space to minimize
the (weighted) distance between the moments implied by the model and those computed
from the data:
◊ˆ = argmin
◊œ 
[ A ≠ 1
S
Sÿ
s=1
 S(◊)]Õ W [ A ≠ 1
S
Sÿ
s=1
 S(◊)], (1.18)
where W is a weighting matrix and   the estimated parameters space. ◊ˆ is consistent for
any positive-definite weighting matrix (e.g. identity matrix) but the smallest asymptotic
variance is obtained when the weighting matrix equals the inverse of the covariance matrix
of the data moments, V . In this case, I use W = diag(V ≠1) (diagonal elements equal
to those of V and o -diagonal elements equal zero) because it has better small sample
properties (see Altonji and Segal (1996)). V is calculated by bootstrap with replacement
on the actual data.25 To minimize the function I use Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm
starting from 1, 000 di erent initial guesses to ensure the solution converges to the global
minima.
To generate the standard errors of the parameter point estimates, I compute the numer-
ical derivatives of the simulated moments with respect to the parameters and using the
24I set N=5,000 and T=200 which implies the number of firms in the simulation is approximately 10
times larger than in the data. I discard the first 50 periods of simulated data to start from the stationary
distribution.
25To preserve the original time-series structure of the data to conduct inference I resample firm’s com-
plete time-series.
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standard SMM formula compute the asymptotic variance:26
SE(◊ˆ) =
Ë
(J ÕWJ)≠1
È1/2
, (1.19)
where J = E(ˆ S(◊)/ˆ◊) of dimension p (#moments) ◊ q (#parameters). Given the
underlying discontinuities of the value functions, I follow the methodology in Bloom
(2009) to compute the numerical derivatives. I calculate the numerical derivative as
f Õ(x) = f(x+Á)≠f(x)Á for an Á of ±5%, ±2.5%, and ±1% of the midpoint of the parameter
space. Then, I simply compute the median value of these derivatives.
1.4.2 Predefined Paramaters
The predefined parameters are shown in Table 1.3. Parameter — is set to be equal to
0.965, which is equivalent to annual real interest rate over the period of study of 3.62%.
Because the curvature of the production function is di cult to identify in the data, I also
set its value a priori. – not only captures the labor share in the total revenue, but also
decreasing returns to scale and the elasticity of demand of firms’ output. If capital is
flexible, the elasticity of demand is infinite, and there is constant return to scale, then –
should equal one. Relaxing any of these assumptions leads to an – < 1 (See Roys and
Gourio (2013)). I choose – equal to 0.85 so that for ÷ = 4 the labor share is consistent
with previous estimations for Chile.27 The value of ce is chosen so that the free-entry
condition (1.10) holds under p = 1, and the wage rate of permanent workers is normalized
to 1.
26See Gouriéroux and Monfort (1997).
27Estimations for the labor share parameter in Chile range from 0.53≠0.6. These estimates are somehow
lower than those for the US economy because of a larger participation of natural resources in the GDP,
and a low stock of human capital.
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Table 1.3: Predefined Parameters in the Model
Parameter Description Value
— Discount rate 0.965
– Curvature production function 0.85
÷ Price elasticity of industry demand 4
1.4.3 Selection of Moments
The choice of moments is guided by their “informativeness” regarding the underlying
structural parameters to be estimated. In particular, the exact choice of moments is
directed by a combination of cross-sectional industry characteristics and time-series em-
ployment dynamics. Heuristically, a moment is informative about a certain parameter if
that moment varies when the parameter varies. Table 1.4 shows the elasticities of model
moments with respect to the model parameters.
To pin down the fixed operating costs parameter I attempt to match the exit rate, the
average firm size, and the firm size and employment distribution. An increase in fixed
operating costs cf increases the minimum level of productivity needed for incumbents
firms to survive. This, in turn, intensifies market selection, and decreases entry barriers,
resulting in a distribution of surviving firms with a larger proportion of high productivity
establishments (see column (1) in Table 1.4). These same moments are also informative
about the mean µ, persistence fl and volatility ‡Á of the productivity process. An increase
in µ or the volatility ‡Á, increase the exit rate, and decrease the average mean size of firms
shifting the size distribution towards more small firms. Instead, the persistence parameter
fl increase the average size of firms and decreases the exit rate, shifting the size distribution
towards more large plants (see columns (3), (4) and (5) in Table 1.4).
To study employment dynamics I use a modified definition of employment growth fol-
lowing Davis and Haltiwanger (1992): git = (xit ≠ xit≠1)/(0.5 ú (xit + xit≠1)), where xit
is the number of employees (subcontracted or permanent) in plant i at time t. This
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growth measure is symmetric about zero, and lies in the close interval [≠2, 2] with deaths
(births) corresponding to the left (right) endpoints. The conventional growth rate measure
(change in employment divided by lagged employment) does not allow for an integrated
treatment of “exits” and “entries”. However, a significant fraction of the adjustments
in subcontracted employment corresponds to these cases so this information cannot be
ignored; this is, plants that hire subcontracted workers this period after not having em-
ployed them the previous period (“entry”), and plants that cease to subcontract today
after having hired subcontracted workers the previous period (“exit”), even when they still
remain in operation. For consistency, growth in both types of employment is computed
using this measure.
A key feature of the employment data is that permanent employment fluctuations are
smoother and less frequent than fluctuations in subcontracted workers. It is transparent
that the distribution of permanent employment growth rates is more peaked and with
heavier tails, implying that there is a higher proportion of extreme events (even when
sharp adjustments are still rare). Instead, the distribution of subcontracted employment
growth rates indicates more smooth and persistent adjustment. Further, the permanent
employment growth distribution has a considerable amount of mass around 0 (see Figure
1.2 in Section 1.1). I select moments that describe these features of the distribution of
both permanent and subcontracted growth rates; this is, volatility and kurtosis of the
distribution, and inaction rate of permanent employment.
To pin down ⁄, · and f I attempt to match the volatility and kurtosis of permanent
and subcontracted employment growth, and the inaction rate of permanent employment
growth. When · increases, firms use more subcontracted workers as they rely more
on these workers to bu er permanent employment from economic fluctuations. As a
consequence, the volatility of permanent employment decreases, the inaction rate of em-
ployment growth increases, and the kurtosis increases (see column (7) in Table 1.4). In
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turn, when ⁄ decreases (the probability of getting tenure for permanent workers increase),
firms have to rely more on permanent workers increasing (decreasing) the volatility (kur-
tosis) of permanent workers growth rate (see column (2) in Table 1.4). Similarly, when
the premium on subcontracted work f increases the volatility of subcontracted workers
increases as firms use subcontract workers more infrequently (see column (6) in Table
1.4). The variance of permanent employment growth rate is informative about the mean,
persistence and volatility of the productivity process.
Lastly, to complete the selection of moments I choose to match the proportion of subcon-
tracted workers over the firm workforce as this is informative about the fixed lay-o  cost
· (i.e. higher firing costs more subcontracting by the firms), the premium over subcon-
tracted workers f (i.e. higher the premium less subcontracting), and ⁄ (i.e. an decrease
in the probability of getting tenure, decreases the adjustment costs of permanent employ-
ment, and the advantage of using subcontracted workers). Note also that the share of
subcontracting is informative about the persistence (i.e. more persistent the risk decreases
and firms use less subcontracted workers), and the volatility of the productivity process
(i.e. an increase in the volatility increases the risk and firms rely more on subcontracted
workers).
1.5 Empirical Results
In this section I present the estimates from the simulated method of moment. In Table
1.5, the column labeled Data reports the actual moments from ENIA, and next to it
the associated standard errors. These show that permanent employment fluctuations are
smoother and less frequent than fluctuations in subcontracted workers (the volatility of
employment growth rate is more than two times for subcontracted work than for perma-
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Table 1.4: Sensitivity of Model Moments to Parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Moments cf ⁄ fl µ ‡Á f ·
Average firm size 1.094 0.005 1.963 -0.201 -0.388 -0.207 -0.045
Exit rate 1.502 0.005 -7.903 0.736 1.550 0.003 -0.006
Fraction of plants in each bin:
10-19 emp. -1.225 -0.004 -2.240 0.073 0.253 -0.160 0.017
20-99 emp. 0.903 0.004 2.165 -0.055 -0.229 0.131 -0.006
100-499 emp. 1.219 -0.001 1.113 -0.029 -0.140 0.002 -0.004
500+ emp. 1.331 -0.001 0.933 -0.084 -0.166 -0.005 -0.001
Share of employment in each bin:
10-19 emp. -1.944 -0.033 -1.125 0.077 0.110 0.085 0.041
20-99 emp. -0.127 0.029 1.276 -0.037 -0.218 0.216 -0.106
100-499 emp. 0.151 -0.008 -0.329 0.086 0.136 -0.064 0.032
500+ emp. 0.296 -0.008 -0.149 -0.001 0.051 -0.072 0.056
Volatility gl 0.838 0.419 -4.293 0.378 0.842 0.056 -0.054
Volatility gs -0.456 0.117 -0.808 0.038 0.335 0.349 -0.330
Kurtosis gl -0.952 -0.241 5.196 -0.476 -1.095 -0.200 0.224
Kurtosis gs 0.182 -0.057 1.617 -0.296 -0.553 -0.148 0.140
Share of subcontracting 0.406 -0.120 -4.916 0.304 0.796 -0.336 0.365
Inaction rate gl -0.302 0.000 1.648 -0.348 -0.464 -0.086 0.155
Notes: this table presents elasticities of model moments with respect to the model parameters. To
calculate the elasticities the numerical derivatives of the model moments with respect to the param-
eters are multiplied by the ratio of the baseline parameters to the baseline moments. The numerical
derivative is the median value of the numerical derivatives f Õ(x) = (f(x+Á)≠f(x))/Á for an Á of ±5%,
±2.5%, and ±1% of the midpoint of the parameter space.
nent work). Similarly, the higher kurtosis of the distribution of permanent employment
growth rates indicates there is a higher proportion of extreme events, alongside long pe-
riods of no adjustments (the share of plants not changing permanent employment in a
year is around 18%). Instead, the lower kurtosis of the distribution of subcontracted
employment growth rates indicates more smooth and persistent adjustments.28
The column labeled Slow Tenure in Table 1.5 presents the moments from the full model
(’benchmark model’) as presented in Section 1.3 evaluated at the estimated parameters.
28Even when it seems that the distribution of subcontracted employment growth rates would have the
most kurtosis (it appears to have all of its mass in its tails as seen in Figure 1.2 in Section 1.1), being
its variance a lot larger in fact it only has few mass in its tails. Instead, even when the distribution of
permanent employment growth rates seems to have fewer mass in its tails, its kurtosis is larger because
those events are much farther away from the mean.
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The model fits the data quite well with the exception of the kurtosis of both permanent
and subcontracted employment distribution, and the inaction rate for gl. The fact that
the model cannot match these facts suggests the need to incorporate some restriction
on the degree of substitutability between both types of labor, or some fixed cost to the
use of subcontracted workers.29 Given that both types of labor are perfect substitutes
in production, firms rely more on subcontracted workers, and adjustments of permanent
employment are neither as frequent not as sharp as in the data. The fact that the volatility
of subcontracted employment growth given by gs fits well the data is also related to the fact
that the model fits relatively high firing costs. In terms of fitting industry characteristics
such as firm and employment distribution, the yearly exit rate and the average firm size
the model performs well.
In Table 1.5 I also display the results for the model restricted to ⁄ = 0; this is, to the
case permanent workers gets tenure immediately after they are hired. As shown by the
increase in the criterion function (from 1,342.5 to 5,265.9), in comparison to the full model
the fit is worst. The reduction in fit is due both to the worst fit of firms and employment
dynamics, suggesting that ignoring the tenure-dependency of firing costs is problematic.
Given the cost of subcontracted workers, and the proportion in which the plants use
subcontracted workers, for the model to fit the low inaction rate for permanent workers it
requires a rather low · . In the benchmark model, much of the flexibility in employment
adjustment is coming from the fact that only a fraction of workers get tenure, and not
only from subcontracting. The low level of firing costs, in turn, produces an excessive
volatility of gl, and an even lower kurtosis of the distribution of permanent employment
growth rates.
29A natural extension of the model would be to assume firms have a CES production functions such
that: y = z(an“ + (1≠ a)s“)–“ , where “ is the degree of substitutability of the two types of labor, – < 1
returns to scale parameters, a share parameter, and z is firm’s productivity. Similarly, we could assume
plants need some level of sophistication or installed capacity to subdivide tasks and be able to subcontract.
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Table 1.5: Simulated Moments Estimations for the Full Model
Panel A: Moments
Moments Data S.E. Simulated Moments
Slow Tenure Quick Tenure
(⁄ > 0) (⁄ = 0)
Average firm size 71.95 1.8782 71.53 64.79
Exit rate 0.091 0.0012 0.098 0.135
Fraction of plants in each bin:
10-19 employees 0.386 0.0049 0.398 0.457
20-99 employees 0.447 0.0049 0.436 0.407
100-499 employees 0.145 0.0038 0.148 0.121
More than 500 employees 0.022 0.0016 0.018 0.016
Share of employment in each bin:
10-19 employees 0.064 0.0021 0.062 0.084
20-99 employees 0.260 0.0081 0.264 0.296
100-499 employees 0.417 0.0118 0.398 0.371
More than 500 employees 0.260 0.0173 0.275 0.249
Volatility gl 0.688 0.0160 0.781 0.818
Volatility gs 2.161 0.0618 2.118 2.519
Kurtosis gl 5.144 0.0606 3.141 2.689
Kurtosis gs 1.973 0.0273 1.645 1.704
Inaction rate gl 0.181 0.0026 0.231 0.175
Share of subcontracting 0.247 0.0053 0.253 0.278
Criterion,  (◊) 1,342.52 5,265.9
Panel B: Parameter Estimates
cf ⁄ fl µ ‡Á f ·
Quick tenure 4.807 - 0.903 0.023 0.139 0.095 0.160
(⁄ = 0) (0.0353) - (0.0197) (0.0047) (0.0198) (0.0027) (0.0421)
Slow tenure 6.384 0.758 0.913 0.029 0.129 0.101 0.593
(0.0403) (0.0284) (0.0113) (0.0025) (0.0121) (0.0025) (0.0284)
Notes: Panel A reports the targeted moments and their corresponding standard errors, and the simulated
moments evaluated at the estimated parameters. The bottom table reports the parameters’ point
estimates and their standard errors in parenthesis.
Panel B of Table 1.5 contains the point estimates of the parameters for both models with
the associated standard errors. In the benchmark model with slow tenure, estimated firing
costs are equivalent to seven months’ wages, and on average workers get tenure after 4
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years in the job.30 In terms of the wage premium on subcontracted workers, the model
estimates are consistent with the data for manufacturing plants in ENIA. On average,
subcontracted workers earned 8 percent more than permanent workers in the period
2001-2007.31 Finally, shocks to productivity are estimated to be 14 percent per year,
the mean growth rate of productivity 2.3% and the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks
0.903. As mentioned, for the model with quick tenure to fit well the relative flexibility
of permanent employment as observed in the data moments, it requires firing costs that
are substantially lower (only two months’ wages). Consistent with the estimations for
the benchmark model, the wage premium on subcontracted workers remains around 10
percent, and the rest of the parameters summarizing firm dynamics are also relatively
stable.
For interpretation, Table 1.6 presents estimations for two additional restricted models.
First, a model without subcontracting, and a positive probability of not getting tenure in
the column labeled Slow tenure. We see the fit of the model is slightly worse in comparison
to the benchmark case in spite of the reduction in the number of moments to fit. In terms
of employment dynamics, the model also has problem fitting the volatility and the kurtosis
of gl when the inaction rate is too low as observed in the data. In the column labeled
Quick tenure I present the estimates of a model that also restricts subcontracting, but
assumes all workers get tenure. Note that this specification of the model is the same
model as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). For this model to fit such a low inaction
rate for permanent employment growth rate is even more problematic. Panel B in Table
1.6 displays the point estimates of the parameters for both models with the associated
30There is no obvious translation between these parameters estimates and the “job security index”
presented in Section 1.2, but the 3-4 month wages suggested by this index do not seem too far of considering
that the estimation might be capturing other costs associated to dismissing workers.
31The wage of subcontracted (permanent) workers is computed as the total wage paid by the estab-
lishment to all subcontracted (permanent) workers divided by the number of subcontracted (permanent)
workers employed by the establishment in that same period. The results are robust to the inclusion of
bonuses on permanent workers’ wages. The widespread perception that subcontracted jobs pay substan-
tially less than permanent ones is largely contaminated by the decline in relative wages of low-skilled
workers, and low-skilled jobs are still subcontracted in a larger proportion than permanent ones.
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standard errors. In the model with quick tenure, estimated firing costs are equivalent
to one month’ wages, while in the model with slow tenure they increase to four months’
wages, as workers get tenure on average after 3 years on the job.
In conclusion, a naive economist that estimates firing costs from these data moments
ignoring firms subcontract to substitute permanent workers would arrive to the conclusion
that firing costs are rather low in this industry. However, the results from the benchmark
model show they are rather high, and the flexibility observed in the data comes from
subcontracted workers being used as an adjustment margin for firms to accommodate
economic shocks.
1.6 Policy Implications
In this section, I extend the partial-equilibrium model to a general equilibrium frame-
work, and using the parameters’ estimates I carry out several policy analysis. I use the
estimations for the four models to analyze the implementation of two alternative labor
market reforms: first, the elimination of subcontracted workers and, second, the reduction
of firing costs to zero when suitable. This experiment is relevant in light of the debate
that pits workers’ demands to limit the use of subcontracting as a way to improve their
working conditions, with those of the business community that advocate a reduction in
firing costs. Finally, it is important to clarify that the model is not appropriate for welfare
analysis as it only considers a frictionless economy in which firing costs have no potential
benefits, but to distort the job reallocation process. The equilibrium allocation with-
out government intervention is Pareto optimal, hence there is no space for improvement
coming from firing costs.32
32See, for example, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and Alonso-Borrego et al. (2004) who analyze the
impact of firing costs in an economy with imperfect insurance markets and search frictions.
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Table 1.6: Simulated Moments Estimations for the Model Without Subcontracting
Panel A: Moments
Moments Data S.E. Simulated Moments
Slow tenure Quick tenure
(⁄ > 0) (⁄ = 0)
Average firm size 66.76 1.7310 67.97 78.71
Exit rate 0.091 0.0012 0.100 0.113
Fraction of plants in each bin:
10-19 employees 0.402 0.0049 0.418 0.321
20-99 employees 0.440 0.0049 0.434 0.482
100-499 employees 0.139 0.0038 0.130 0.173
More than 500 employees 0.019 0.0015 0.018 0.024
Share of employment in each bin:
10-19 employees 0.071 0.0023 0.076 0.057
20-99 employees 0.272 0.0084 0.283 0.275
100-499 employees 0.423 0.0121 0.368 0.398
More than 500 employees 0.234 0.0177 0.274 0.270
Volatility gl 0.688 0.0160 0.833 0.806
Kurtosis gl 5.144 0.0606 3.035 2.834
Inaction rate gl 0.181 0.0026 0.153 0.244
Criterion,  (◊) 1,524.4 2,937.9
Panel B: Parameter Estimates
cf ⁄ fl µ ‡Á f ·
Quick tenure 7.756 - 0.871 0.048 0.144 - 0.133
(⁄ = 0) (0.0263) - (0.0092) (0.0032) (0.0068) - (0.0048)
Slow tenure 5.654 0.684 0.915 0.016 0.133 - 0.285
(0.0546) (0.0234) (0.0283) (0.0017) (0.0247) - (0.0268)
Notes: Panel A reports the targeted moments and their corresponding standard errors, and the simulated
moments evaluated at the estimated parameters. The bottom table reports the parameters’ point
estimates and their standard errors in parenthesis.
1.6.1 General Equilibrium Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical two member households: workers
that supply labor under a permanent contract and subcontracted workers. Each household
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has preferences defined over consumption and labor supply given by:
Œÿ
t=1
—t[log(ct)≠B n
1+„
t
1 + „ ], (1.20)
where ct > 0 is total consumption, and nt is labor e ort. Parameters B and „ represent
preferences for leisure, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, respectively.
Households take all of the income from all of the workers, and allocate it to the individuals
within the household. Also, they allocate total hours worked independent of which workers
performs the e ort.
The output price is normalized to one, and the households supplies labor to the market
at the wage w = ≠un/uc = Bcn„. As before, both members of the household are
perfect substitutes in production, but permanent workers are relatively less expensive as
subcontractors’ charges are higher than the firm’s own production costs. Subcontract
firms incur in a real cost for “creating” subcontracted workers, and the premium they
charge to the main firm per worker is just enough to cover the real cost c so that their
profits are zero: fi(st) = (wst ≠ c)st = 0. The cost for firms to subcontract a worker
is wst = wt(1 + f). I consider a stationary equilibrium, so all prices and aggregates in
the economy are constant, and household maximization implies the interest rate satisfies
1/(1 + r) = —.
An individual firm that employed lt≠1 permanent workers last period and draws a pro-
ductivity shock zt this period has expected adjustment costs given by:
r(lt≠1, zt;w) = [1≠X(lt, zt;w)]
⁄
g(nt+1, lt)dF (zt+1, zt) +X(lt, zt;w)g(0, lt), (1.21)
where nt+1 = L(lt, zt+1;w). Integration yields aggregate adjustment costs given by
R(µ,M ;w). I assume proceeds from the regulation are rebated uniformly to all households
as a lump-sum payment to households by the government. In fact, severance payments
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make up for the largest part of firing costs in Chile, and are paid entirely to the workers
when they are fired. Aggregate adjustment costs do not appear in the resource constraint
as they appear in both sides of the equation.
The demand curve in Section 1.3 is replaced by the resource constraint:
C = Y ≠Mce ≠ F (1.22)
where output is given by:
Y =
⁄
zú
[f(L(l, z; p), S(n, z; p), z)≠ cf ]dµ(z, l) +M
⁄
zú
f(L(0, z; p), S(n, z; p), z)d‹(z),
(1.23)
and the fees paid by the firms for the subcontracted workers are given by:
F = fw
5⁄
zú
S(n, z;w)dµ(z, l) +M
⁄
zú
S(n, z;w)d‹(z)
6
. (1.24)
Finally, the clearing condition for the labor market is given by:
N s(µ,M ;w) =
⁄
zú
[L(l, z;w) + S(n, z;w)]dµ(z, l) +M
⁄
zú
[L(0, z;w) + S(n, z;w)]d‹(z)
(1.25)
A stationary industry equilibrium with positive entry and exit is a set of value func-
tions and decision rules, a wage wú, a stationary distribution of firms µú, and a mass of
entrants Mú such that:
1. Given prices, the value functions of the firms and the policy functions are consistent
with firms optimization.
2. There is an invariant distribution over firms: µú = T (µú,Mú;wú).
3. The resource constraint (equation 1.22) and the labor market clearing conditions
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(equation 1.25) are satisfied.
4. The free entry (equation 1.10) is satisfied.
1.6.2 Results
In this section I present the results for the policy analysis. Few things to consider before
presenting the results: first, I only compare steady-state values, and do not discuss the
transitional dynamics. Second, I need to parametrize labor supply preferences: I set the
elasticity of labor „ = 0.84 (see Medina and Soto (2007) for estimations for Chile), and
B = 11.62 so that total employment is 0.25.
1.6.2.1 Aggregate outcomes, prices and labor market
Table 1.7 reports the steady-e ects of reducing firing costs in the four estimated models.
The column label Full model/Slow tenure shows the e ect of reducing firing costs in the
benchmark model. Output goes up 3.54 percent when firing costs are eliminated, both
due to an increase in productivity (+1.02 percent) coming from the better allocation of
resources, and in total employment (+2.49 percent). The increase in permanent workers
is even larger, as all the jobs previously assigned to subcontracted workers are reallocated
to workers inside the firm. In the absence of firing costs, the wage of permanent workers
goes up 5.75 percent as the distortions coming from firing costs disappear.
One of the main findings of the paper comes from the comparison of the e ect of reducing
firing costs between my benchmark model and the model without subcontracting/quick
tenure. The column labeled No subcontracting/quick tenure in Table 1.7 presents the
e ect of reducing firing costs in a model that is equivalent to the framework in Hopen-
hayn and Rogerson (1993). In this case, eliminating the regulation has also a positive
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impact on output, labor productivity and employment, though the e ect is substantially
larger in comparison to the e ect of the same reform applied to my benchmark economy.
In particular, the e ect is larger on labor productivity, as subcontracting workers firms
circumvent the regulation, and improve the allocation of labor in heavily regulated en-
vironments. The allocation of resources, therefore, in an economy where firms cannot
subcontract is more ine cient, and the benefits of removing the regulation are larger.
Even when firing costs (as a percentage of the wage bill of permanent workers) are sub-
stantially larger in the benchmark economy (i.e. 6.1 versus 3.4 percent) the firms in this
economy use resources more e ciently, and better allocate labor due to the presence of
subcontracted workers.
For completeness, the table also presents the results of removing the regulation in the
benchmark economy, but when permanent workers get tenure quickly, and in the model
without subcontracting when permanent workers slowly get tenure. The results are still
consistent with the fact that firms manage risk better in the presence of subcontracted
workers, as they bu er the regular workforce from economic fluctuations to avoid workers’
firing costs by subcontracting workers.
Table 1.7: Steady-State E ects of Eliminating Firing Costs
Full model No subcontracting
Quick
tenure
Slow
tenure
Quick
tenure
Slow
tenure
Output 2.87 3.54 4.20 2.24
Consumption 2.81 3.59 2.90 2.28
Average labor productivity 0.88 1.02 2.49 0.32
Total employment 1.97 2.49 1.67 1.92
Permanent 3.09 3.73 1.67 1.92
Wage permanent workers 4.51 5.75 4.34 3.92
Layo  costs/wage bill (before) 0.036 0.061 0.034 0.040
Subcontracting costs/wage bill (before) 0.087 0.092 - -
Notes: The table reports the steady-state percentage change if the firing costs are eliminated starting
from each of the di erent estimated models.
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Table 1.8 shows the results from the comparison between the benchmark economy (with
quick and slow tenure), and the new stationary equilibria associated with eliminating
subcontracted workers.33 The results show that output, employment and productivity
go down when subcontracted workers are prohibited, as this change eliminates a margin
that firms exploit to adjust to productivity shocks; firms fire subcontracted workers as a
response to a negative shocks without paying firing costs. Instead, in the model without
subcontracted workers, firms are forced to smooth their employment level over time to
reduce firing costs. In the benchmark model, the lower output comes more from a decrease
in the number of workers than from a decrease in average labor productivity. Instead,
in the model with quick tenure the e ects comes from a slow down in the reallocation of
workers, and a decrease in productivity, and not so much from a decrease in employment.
Firms in the economy with slow tenure use resources more e ciently, and already allocate
employment better (i.e. subcontracted costs/wage bill are 0.092% in the economy with
slow tenure versus 0.087% in the quick tenure economy). These results come against
the common view that subcontracted jobs are of lower quality, and that they decrease
productivity. We see that the winners from this policy are permanent workers which
increase in their hirings.
Row 5 reports the change in the wage of permanent workers in both models. When sub-
contracted workers are eliminated, there is a decrease in the wage of permanent workers
coming from the increase in the number of permanent workers which lowers average labor
productivity. As productivity decreases a lot more in the model with quick tenure, the
e ect on wages is also substantially larger. This lower wage compensates firms for the
higher average adjustment cost of labor (i.e layo  costs/wage bill increase 1.74 and 0.67
percent).
33In the model, to eliminate subcontracted workers I assume the fee charged by the subcontract firm
becomes su ciently high.
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Table 1.8: Steady-State E ects of Eliminating Subcontracted Workers
Quick tenure Slow tenure
Output -0.146 -0.082
Average labor productivity -0.095 -0.020
Mass of firms -0.620 -0.227
Layo  costs/wage bill 1.738 0.674
Total employment -0.051 -0.062
permanent 1.073 1.150
Wage permanent workers -0.058 -0.018
Layo  costs/wage bill
before 0.036 0.061
after 0.037 0.062
Subcontracting costs/wage bill 0.087 0.092
Notes: The table reports the steady-state percentage change if subcontracted work
was eliminated from both of models or, equivalently, if the wage premium on
subcontracted workers was prohibitively high.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the e ect of firing costs on aggregate outcomes when firms can
circumvent the regulation subcontracting as a substitute for hiring full-time workers. In
countries with strict job security regulations firms use flexible sta ng arrangements to
bu er the regular workforce from economic fluctuations and avoid workers’ firing costs. I
set up an industry equilibrium model in the tradition of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
with heterogeneous firms and endogenous entry and exit, where firms can hire two types
of workers: permanent workers that entail random firing costs, and subcontractors that
are totally flexible, but carry a wage premium above the compensation permanent workers
demand.
The results for the model estimations show that to match plant-level employment dynam-
ics in the manufacturing sector in Chile subcontracted workers are needed. Put di erently,
a model that ignores this adjustment margin yields firing costs that are too low and very
much at odds with empirical data. In the model with subcontracted workers firing costs
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are equivalent to seven months’ wages, and permanent workers get tenure after approx-
imately 4 years in the job. Firms, in this framework, are willing to pay a rather large
wage premium on subcontracted workers to be able to substitute for hiring workers (10
percent). Instead, in the model without subcontracted workers, firing costs are equivalent
to only one month’s wage.
These findings are consistent with the results from the policy experiments which show
that allowing firms to subcontract workers increases output, employment and produc-
tivity. Subcontracted workers allow firms to respond more aggressively to productivity
shocks, which enhances the allocation of labor across firms and hence total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). Further, when firms can subcontract, the negative e ects of firing costs
in aggregate outcomes are less than previously estimated in the literature.
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A.1 Solution algorithm
A.1.1 Partial equilibrium model
In this section, I present the solution algorithm for the partial-equilibrium model. Basi-
cally, the algorithm consists of two steps: 1) find the unique price pú that is consistent
with the free entry condition; 2) second, find the fixed point of .
Step 1 Iterate over pi until the entry condition is satisfied at pú:
(a) For each pi, compute Vi(l, z; pi) and Vi(0, z; pi)
(b) Let EC(pi) ©
s
V (0, z; p)d‹(z)/pi ≠ ce. If EC(pi) > 0, then set pi+1 < pi,
otherwise set pi+1 > pi.
Step 2 Iterate over (µi,Mi) until Qd = Qs at (µú,Mú):
(a) Letting M0 = 1, solve for the stationary distribution µss0 using the law of
motion for the distribution of firms (equation 1.12)
(b) Let EQ(µi,Mi) © Qd ≠ Qs(µssi (Mi),Mi; pú). If EQ(µi,Mi) > 0, then set
Mi+1 > Mi, otherwise set Mi+1 < Mi. When EQ(µi+1,Mi+1) ¥ 0 then
(µi+1,Mi+1) = (µú,Mú)
A.1.2 General equilibrium model
To solve the general equilibrium model as explained in Section 1.6, the algorithm starts
with Step 1 as before, but solving for the wage of permanent workers wi instead of pi.
Then, I continue on to Step 2a:
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Step 2a Iterate over (µi,Mi) until the resource constraint C = Y ≠Mce ≠ F and the
labor market clearing condition Ld = N s are satisfied at (µú,Mú):
(a) Letting M0 = 1, solve for the stationary distribution µss0 using the law of
motion for the distribution of firms (equation 1.12)
(b) Let LMC(µi,Mi) © Ld(µssi (Mi),Mi;wú) ≠ N s[wú, (µssi (Mi),Mi;wú)]. If
LMC(µi,Mi) > 0, then set Mi+1 < Mi, otherwise set Mi+1 > Mi. When
LMC(µi+1,Mi+1) ¥ 0 then (µi+1,Mi+1) = (µú,Mú)
Chapter 2
Business cycle dynamics and asset prices with capital adjustment costs
2.1 Introduction
Standard business cycle models (RBC) are successful in accounting for the main statisti-
cal features of macroeconomic aggregate quantities.1 However, their success is relatively
modest in terms of their ability to match asset-pricing facts. In an attempt to unite
business cycle dynamics and asset returns, Tallarini (2000) adapts Epstein-Zin (EZ) pref-
erences to a standard RBC model to disentangle individual attitudes towards risk and
towards intertemporal substitution. By increasing risk aversion, without changing the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), the model’s asset pricing predictions im-
prove significantly without a ecting quantity dynamics. When risk aversion increases,
agents can only increase precautionary savings to lessen the e ects of technology shocks,
as substituting across states of nature is not possible. Instead, when the IES changes,
agents choose di erent consumption paths a ecting quantity dynamics.
Even when this framework is regarded as promising to line up quantity dynamics and
asset prices in production economies, Tallarini’s model lacks relevant features. First, the
model is incapable of generating any significant equity premium as the risk in standard
RBC models comes entirely from technology shocks. Without adjustment costs, capital
can be transferred instantaneously to and from consumption, making the relative price of
capital always equal to one. Capital adjustment costs, instead, make it costly for agents
1Standard RBC models refer to frameworks with agents maximizing expected discounted utility under
complete markets and no frictions in capital accumulation. The main statistical features are that invest-
ment is almost three times more volatile than output, while consumption is less volatile than output, and
hours worked show almost the same volatility. In general, macroeconomic variables tend to be strongly
procyclical, and they show substantial persistence.
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to smooth fluctuations in consumption through the production sector, inducing them
to take more consumption risk and increasing the equity premium. Second, the higher
risk in an economy with capital adjustment costs could potentially a ect investment and
consumption decisions, and business cycle dynamics breaking down Tallarini’s “separation
theorem”. Finally, Tallarini (2000) only considers the unity IES case ignoring the model’s
ability to improve aggregate quantity predictions through a better calibration of this
parameter.
To address these issues, this paper analyzes the e ects of convex capital adjustment
costs on business cycle and asset pricing when consumers have recursive preferences. In
a standard one-sector stochastic growth model I unite the success of Epstein and Zin
(1989) non-expected utility preferences with a fleshed-out production technology with
convex capital adjustment costs in the style of Jermann (1998). The proposed model
accounts for the main statistical features of macroeconomic aggregate quantities. At the
same time, adjustment costs increase the equity risk premium, with the mean stock return
and its standard deviation in the order of magnitude that are closer to the data. Further,
for a plausible calibration the model produces a stable and rather low risk-free rate.
In this paper I also produce a comprehensive study of the asset pricing and business
cycle implications of a one-sector stochastic growth model with capital adjustment costs
and Epstein-Zin preferences. For this purpose, I first investigate the impact on quantity
dynamics of changes in agents’ attitude towards risk for di erent calibrations of the IES
and the capital adjustment costs parameter. The results show that regardless of the
calibration for the IES and the level of adjustment costs on capital, the behavior of
aggregate quantities does not depend on attitudes towards risk. The endogenous amount
risk coming from productivity shocks in this model economy with capital adjustment costs
is not enough to generate a di erent response from consumption, investment or hours
worked when risk aversion is increased. Even when capital adjustment costs increase the
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amount of risk in the model, this is still not enough to generate a significant di erence in
the second moment of the quantity variables.
Second, I examine the model’s asset-pricing predictions under di erent calibrations of
the risk aversion, the IES and the level of capital adjustment costs. This exercise is
interesting because Epstein-Zin preferences disentangle the IES from risk aversion, which
implies agents have a preference for the timing of resolution of uncertainty: expected
returns do not only depend on the covariance of return with consumption growth (as
in the power utility case), but also on the covariance with future consumption growth.2
Further, capital adjustment costs introduce a wedge between the market value of installed
capital and production cost today, eventually inducing agents to take more consumption
risk. Hence, asset prices are volatile not only because productivity is random but also
because capital prices change when investment changes.
In the main result of the model, I show both features contribute to broaden the asset-
pricing facts the model can match. In contrast to the results in Tallarini (2000), when
risk aversion increases, both excess return volatility and the equity premium increase
in the model with capital adjustment costs, coming closer to match the data. Further,
as precautionary savings increase mean capital stock, the risk-free rate decreases also
contributing to the results. The comparative statistic exercise shows that to generate
a reasonable volatility for the equity return when shocks to technology are permanent,
the model requires a rather high calibration for the IES. This also helps to match the
mean risk-free rate and its volatility to the data. A lower IES makes agents highly averse
to substitute consumption over time, increasing the volatility of the marginal rate of
substitution, and generating an excessive risk-free rate variation.3
2These two sources of volatility have become known as short- and long-run risk factors, see Bansal and
Yaron (2004) for further details.
3Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) and Croce (2014) show that the nature of the exogenous tech-
nology shock (i.e. transitory or permanent) and individual’s preferences for the timing of resolution of
uncertainty plays a crucial role in terms of the contribution of the long-run risk to the price of risk. In
the case of a permanent productivity shock, the endogenous correlation between shocks to realized and
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Finally, I investigate whether Tallarini’s “separation theorem” breaks down when risk
is time-varying. To address this issue while preserving the simplicity of the model, I
introduce an alternative specification for the conditional volatility of productivity growth
rates following the literature on time-varying volatility in finance. In this specification
of the model, I assume the standard deviation of productivity follows an AR(1) process.
I find that when risk is time-varying Tallarini’s “separation theorem” breaks down, and
macroeconomic quantities are a ected by attitudes towards risk. Since asset prices also
respond to the increased risk, there is a correlation between quantity dynamics and risk
premia.
Related Literature This paper is at the intersection of two of the broad strands of
literature that try to reconcile business cycle and asset pricing facts in a general equi-
librium framework. First, it is related to the collection of papers that resort to di erent
specifications of preferences to account for asset market implications.4 Jermann (1998)
and Boldrin et al. (2001) introduce habit formation into agents’ preferences in a standard
RBC model. Habit-formation preferences raise the variation of marginal rates of substi-
tution across states, and hence generate the equity premium. However, they also increase
the marginal rate of substitution over time inducing an excessive risk-free rate varia-
tion. Epstein-Zin preferences address this issue as they disentangle individual attitudes
towards risk and towards intertemporal substitution; Tallarini (2000) shows that by in-
creasing risk aversion (without changing the IES), RBC model’s asset pricing predictions
expected consumption growth is positive. If individuals have preferences for early resolution of uncer-
tainty (i.e. dislike shocks to realized and expected consumption growth) long-run risk carries a positive
price of risk. Instead, with a mean-reverting shock expected consumption growth is negatively correlated
with realized consumption growth, acting as a hedge and decreasing the overall price of risk. They show
that both shocks can be calibrated to match the high price of risk, and the low risk-free rate with a low
coe cient of risk aversion.
4In standard RBC models, with time and state separable preferences, the coe cient of relative risk
aversion is equal to the reciprocal of the IES. Increasing risk aversion to increase the curvature of the
utility function does not increase the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, but has the perverse e ect
of making consumption even smoother: a higher risk aversion decreases the IES, producing individuals
highly averse to substitute consumption over time. They prefer to change investment instead of making
any adjustment in consumption.
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improve significantly without a ecting quantity dynamics.5
The second strand of this literature incorporates capital adjustment costs to improve
asset market predictions. In production economies, agents can easily adjust investment,
hours worked or any other margin to obtain a smooth consumption paths when a shock
hits the economy.6 Capital adjustment costs make it costly for capital to adjust rapidly,
introducing a wedge between the market value of installed capital and production cost
today, eventually inducing agents to take more consumption risk. For instance, in the case
of a concave cost of adjustment function, a higher investment rate implies a higher price of
capital and so the wedge increases when investment increases. In a such an economy, asset
prices are volatile not only because productivity is random but also because capital prices
change when investment changes (Jermann, 1998; Boldrin et al., 2001; Kuehn, 2010).
The studies closest to mine are Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010), Campanale et al.
(2010) and Croce (2014); the three studies investigate asset pricing implications of a
one-sector stochastic growth model with recursive preferences and convex capital adjust-
ment costs. We di er in that Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) assume households
experience no disutility of labor, and hours worked in their framework is always fixed at
the maximum possible; not allowing hours worked to vary over the cycle increases the
volatility of consumption growth contributing to improve the asset pricing predictions
of the model. Campanale et al. (2010), on the other hand, works with broader set of
preferences belonging to Chew-Dekel class which nests the particular case of Epstein-Zin
preferences. Finally, Croce (2014) introduces a long-run component in the productivity
growth process, and shows that it contributes to improve both business cycle statistics
and asset pricing predictions.
5In a similar framework, Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) show that a model with permanent
technology shocks and a high IES can match the high price of risk and the low volatility of the risk-free
rate with a low coe cient of relative risk aversion.
6For a discussion on the role of labor/leisure as an adjustment margin see, for instance, Lettau and
Uhlig (2000), Uhlig (2007), and Jaccard (2010).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the basic model,
and outlines the calibration. Section 2.3 presents the results for the comparative statistic
exercises changing risk aversion, IES and capital adjustment costs, and discusses the
quantitative implications of these findings. Section 2.4 concludes. The Appendix provides
details on the computational methods used, and additional derivations.
2.2 Model
In this section I present the model which considers a frictionless standard RBC model—
one-sector stochastic growth model. I start by motivating the elements in the model.
First, agents have non-expected utility preferences over consumption and leisure in the
class of recursive preferences considered by Epstein and Zin (1989). I consider a very
general specification for preferences that nests the specific case of unity IES since it
allows the performance of interesting comparative analysis parameterizing the model for
di erent values of the IES parameter and the risk aversion. Asset pricing implications
of endogenous long-run risk significantly depend on agents’ preferences for the timing of
the resolution of uncertainty–whether the coe cient of risk aversion is higher, smaller or
equal to the inverse of the IES parameter.7 Hence, the importance of considering this
di erent calibrations for the IES.
Second, I assume costs of adjustment to capital in the form of Jermann (1998). Adjust-
ment costs make it costly for capital to adjust rapidly, introducing a wedge between the
market value of installed capital and production cost today. Given that the cost of adjust-
ment function is concave, a higher investment rate implies a higher price of capital and so
the wedge increases when investment increases. In this model, therefore, asset prices are
volatile not only because productivity is random but also because capital prices change
when investment changes.
7See, for instance, Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010)
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Finally, in my paper I only consider permanent technology shocks. Several studies point
to the relevance of considering the interactions between di erent technology processes and
long-run risk. Hence, I leave for future work the study of transitory productivity shocks
in a model like this.
2.2.1 Basic setup
The economy is populated by a large number of identical and infinitely lived households,
who maximize recursive utility over consumption and hours worked. These households
trade in the stock and bond market, and perceive dividends for holding the firm’s stocks.
There is also a continuum of identical price-taking firms that own the capital, produce out-
put, invest and pay wages to the households. They finance the purchase of capital selling
claims to their cash flows to households. Labor is supplied elastically by households.
2.2.1.1 Representative household
The representative household maximizes recursive utility over consumption Ct and hours
worked Nt following Epstein and Zin (1989) such that:
Vt =
3
(1≠ —)u(Ct, Nt)1≠“ + —Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
1≠“
1≠◊
4 1
1≠“
(2.1)
where the per period utility index is u(C,N) = C‹(1≠N)1≠‹ .
Given that u is homogeneous of degree one, “ Ø 0 is the inverse of the IES Â over
the consumption-leisure bundle, and ◊ Ø 0 controls risk aversion towards static gambles
over the bundle. The term Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
1
1≠◊ is called a “risk-adjustment” or the “certain
equivalent” of future utility. The discount factor is — and the time-period is assumed to
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be one quarter.8
This specification for preferences allows for a separation between attitudes towards risk,
which govern portfolio choice, and attitudes towards intertemporal substitution which
lead to smooth consumption. This framework produces agents with preferences for the
timing of the resolution of uncertainty: they prefer an early resolution of uncertainty if
◊ > 1Â , a late resolution of uncertainty if ◊ < 1Â , and they are indi erent if one is the
reciprocal of the other. In the latter case, when ◊ = 1Â , recursive preferences collapse to
the standard time-separable expected discounted utility case.
The household budget constraint is
Wt+1 = (Wt + wtNt ≠ Ct)RWt+1, (2.2)
where Wt denotes wealth and RWt+1 = stRet+1 + (1 ≠ st)Rft+1 the return on the wealth
portfolio. Households invest a proportion st of their wealth in a risky claim on the firm’s
dividend stream that returns Ret+1, and the rest (1 ≠ st) in a risk-free bond with return
Rft+1.
From the household optimality condition the equity return satisfies the standard asset
pricing formula
Et[Mt,t+1Ret+1] = 1, (2.3)
where Ret+1 = Pt+1+Dt+1Pt . Similarly, the return on the risk-free rate can also be expressed
in terms of the stochastic discount factor as
Rft+1 =
1
Et[Mt,t+1]
. (2.4)
8It can be shown that when IES=1 preferences simplify to: Vt = u(Ct, Nt)1≠—Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
—
1≠◊ as specify
in Tallarini (2000).
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In this economy the stochastic discount factor (SDF) Mt,t+1 is given by9
Mt,t+1 = —
3
Ct+1
Ct
4v(1≠“)≠1 31≠Nt+1
1≠Nt
4(1≠v)(1≠“)Qa Vt+1
Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
1
1≠◊
Rb“≠◊ (2.5)
When “ ”= ◊ an extra term
A
Vt+1
Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
1
1≠◊
B“≠◊
appears in the expression for the old power
formula for the SDF: expected returns not only depend on the covariance of returns
with consumption growth as in the standard consumption-based model, but also on the
covariance of returns with the utility index. Since the utility index is function of the
distribution of future consumption, news about agents’ future perspectives matter as well
as current consumption conditions.
2.2.1.2 Representative firm
The representative firm produces a single good using a standard constant returns to scale
production technology
Yt = K–t (ZtNt)1≠–, (2.6)
where Yt is aggregate output, Kt is the fixed stock of capital carried into date t, and Zt
is an exogenous, labor-enhancing technology level.
The firm accumulates capital subject to adjustment costs according to
Kt+1 = (1≠ ”)Kt + „
3
It
Kt
4
Kt, (2.7)
where It Ø 0 is aggregate investment and takes one period to be reflected in capital, ”
is the rate of depreciation of capital and „(·) is a weakly concave function that describes
the form of convex capital adjustment costs in the model. Following Jermann (1998), this
9See Appendix A.1 for a short derivation.
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function is defined as
„
3
It
Kt
4
= a1 +
a2
(1≠ ÷)
3
It
Kt
4(1≠÷)
, (2.8)
where ÷ is the inverse of the elasticity of the investment rate to Tobin’s q. Parameters a1
and a2 are normalized to be a1 = ÷1≠÷ (1≠ ” ≠ eµ) and a2 = (eµ ≠ 1 + ”)÷ so that capital
adjustment costs are zero in the steady-state.
The technology process is defined as
Zt = eµt+z˜t (2.9)
z˜t = flz˜t≠1 + ‡Át, (2.10)
where Át are standard normally distributed i.i.d random shocks, and fl determines the
persistence of the shock process.
Each period the firm optimally chooses Nt and It to maximize the present discounted
value of all current and future expected cash flows:
Et
Œÿ
s=0
Mt,t+s(F (Kt+s, Zt+sNt+s)≠ wt+sNt+s ≠ It+s) (2.11)
where Mt,t+s is the stochastic discount factor of the households, the owners of the firm
in this economy.
The firm’s equilibrium conditions for investment can be characterized by
Et
Ë
Mt,t+1R
I
t+1
È
= 1, (2.12)
where the investment return RIt+1 is defined as
Ri,t+1 © „Õ(It/Kt)
I
–
3
Zt+1
Kt+1
41≠–
+ 1≠ ” + „(It+1/Kt+1)
„Õ(It+1/Kt+1)
≠ It+1
Kt+1
J
. (2.13)
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Given that the production technology and the cost of adjustment function are linearly
homogeneous the return to capital is equivalent to the market return to an unlevered firm
claim (dividends). Capital and labor are paid their marginal product such that wages
and dividends are defined by wt = (1≠ –) YtNt and Dt = –Yt ≠ It, respectively.
Finally, the representative agent is endowed with one unit of time which can be used for
leisure or labor such that
Lt +Nt Æ 1, (2.14)
and the resource constraint is given by
Ct + It Æ Yt. (2.15)
2.2.2 Stationary recursive representation
In this section I specify the recursive representation of the model used for the numerical
solution. The household’s problem is indexed by two state variables Kt and Zt, two
independent control variables Ct and Nt, and one (normal) shock Át.
Given the first welfare theorem holds the problem of this economy can be formulated in
terms of the social planner’s problem:
V (K,Z) = max
C,N,I
;5
(1≠ —)(Cv(1≠N)1≠v)1≠“ + —
1
EÁÕV (K Õ, Z Õ)1≠◊
2 1≠“
1≠◊
6
1
1≠“
<
, (2.16)
subject to
C + I = K–(ZN)1≠–,
K Õ = (1≠ ”)K + „
1
It
Kt
2
K,
Z Õ = Zeµ+‡ÁÕ .
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To have a stationary economy the problem is normalized by Zt. Given the homotheticity
of the utility function, the value function is homogeneous of degree v in K and Z. Hence,
the value function is redefine as V (K,Z) = Zvg(k)
1
1≠“ where g satisfies the following
Bellman equation and k = KZ , c = CZ and i = IZ :10
g(k) = max
c,i,N
I
(1≠ —)(cv(1≠N)1≠v)1≠“ + —eµv(1≠“)
3
EÁÕ
5
e‡Á
Õv(1≠◊)g(kÕ)
1≠◊
1≠“
64 1≠“
1≠◊
J
(2.17)
subject to
c+ i = k–N1≠–,
kÕ = (1≠”)k+„(
i
k )k
eµ+‡ÁÕ .
The model has a steady state solution in the transformed variables. I worked directly on
the appropriately set of normalized equations and then “renormalized” once solved the
model. See the Appendix for a detailed explanation on the computational method.
2.2.3 Calibration
The set of parameters necessary to compute the model is:
  = {—,–, ”, fl, µ,‡Á, ‹, ◊, “, ÷} (2.18)
where — is the discount rate, – is capital share in the production function, ” is the
depreciation rate of capital, µ, and ‡Á are the parameters that define the productivity
process, ‹ is the exponent on consumption, ◊ is risk aversion, “ is the inverse of IES, and
÷ defines the curvature of the capital adjustment cost function.
For the calibration of the model I use standard values in the macroeconomic literature.
Since the interest of this paper lies in the e ects on asset returns and business cycle
10Note that the problem needs to be transformed into a min if “ > 1.
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variables of changing the risk aversion, the IES and the curvature of the adjustment cost
function I present results for the model under di erent calibrations of these parameters.
It is worth noting that the calibrated capital adjustment costs used in this paper are
within the range of such costs reported in the literature.11 Table 2.1 summarizes the
parameters’ values.
Table 2.1: Parameter Assignments
Parameter Description Value
— Discount rate 0.9926
– Capital share 0.34
” Depreciation rate 0.021
µ Technology drift 0.004
‹ Exponent on consumption 0.25
⁄ Leverage 2
‡Á Std. dev. productivity shock 0.0115
◊ Risk aversion (1, 10, 25, 100)
1/“ IES (0.1, 1, 1.5)
÷ Adjustment costs (0, 0.2, 0.6)
2.3 Main results
In this section I present the main results of the paper. First, I discuss the implications
of increasing risk aversion on the business cycle properties of the model, and analyze the
implications for business cycle dynamics of changes in the IES and the capital adjustment
costs. Second, I present the asset pricing implications of introducing costs of adjustment
to the standard real business cycle model, and perform several comparative exercises
changing the IES and the ÷ as well. Finally, I consider the e ect in macroeconomic
dynamics of increasing risk aversion when the model incorporates time-varying volatility
for TFP shocks.
11See [to be completed]
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2.3.1 Business cycle statistics
Table 2.2 reports the steady-state mean values of capital, output, consumption, invest-
ment and hours worked for di erent values of the relative risk aversion coe cient and
the capital adjustment costs parameter ÷ when the IES equals 1.5, 1 and 0.2. In the
case of IES=1 (Panel B), an increase in the coe cient of relative risk aversion from 1
(expected utility case) to 100 increases the mean value of all macro variables between 1
percent (hours worked) to 8 percent (capital), approximately. The e ect of increased risk
aversion in mean quantities is smaller for larger capital adjustment costs.
An increase in risk aversion increases precautionary savings as standard production tech-
nologies do not allow agents to hedge themselves against technology shocks. The only
action they can take to mitigate the e ects of these shocks is to increase their savings to
augment wealth next period. The increase in precautionary savings is smaller when there
are adjustments costs in the economy because adjustment costs induce firms to invest
less aggressively in response to technology shocks reducing the need for higher precau-
tionary savings. The same conclusions hold when the elasticity of substitution is greater
or smaller than unity (see Panel A and C in Table 2.2).
Along the same lines, the e ects of increased risk aversion on aggregate quantities’ volatil-
ity and cross-correlations is almost negligible independent on the calibration for IES and
the capital adjustment costs in the model. Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 report the standard
deviation, and cross-correlations of consumption, investment and hours worked with out-
put for increased risk aversion for IES= [0.2, 1, 1.5] and ÷ = [0, 0.2, 0.6]. The endogenous
amount of risk coming from productivity shocks in this economy is not enough to generate
a di erent response from consumption, investment or hours worked when risk aversion
is increased. Even when adjustment costs increase the risk, this is still not enough to
generate a significant di erence in the second moment of the quantity variables. Intro-
66
Table 2.2: Steady-State Mean Values Changing 1/“, ◊ and ÷
Panel A: 1/“ = 1.5
÷ = 0 ÷ = 0.2 ÷ = 0.6
◊ k y c i N k y c i N k y c i N
1 8.17 0.77 0.57 0.20 0.23 8.17 0.77 0.57 0.20 0.23 8.11 0.77 0.57 0.20 0.23
100 8.79 0.80 0.58 0.22 0.23 8.55 0.79 0.58 0.21 0.23 8.22 0.78 0.57 0.21 0.23
Panel B: 1/“ = 1
÷ = 0 ÷ = 0.2 ÷ = 0.6
◊ k y c i N k y c i N k y c i N
1 8.01 0.77 0.57 0.20 0.23 8.01 0.77 0.57 0.20 0.23 7.95 0.77 0.57 0.20 0.23
100 8.62 0.79 0.58 0.22 0.23 8.42 0.78 0.57 0.21 0.23 8.10 0.77 0.57 0.20 0.23
Panel C: 1/“ = 0.2
÷ = 0 ÷ = 0.2 ÷ = 0.6
◊ k y c i N k y c i N k y c i N
1 6.50 0.70 0.54 0.16 0.22 6.50 0.70 0.54 0.16 0.22 6.36 0.70 0.53 0.16 0.22
100 7.15 0.73 0.55 0.18 0.23 7.04 0.73 0.55 0.18 0.23 6.77 0.71 0.54 0.17 0.23
Notes: the table shows the steady-state mean values for di erent values of the adjustment cost pa-
rameter ÷, and IES 1/“ for high and low risk aversion. The rest of the parameters are given in Table
2.1.
ducing adjustment costs to the model does not change the main conclusions of Tallarini’s
“separation” between quantity dynamics and risk aversion.12
Even when the increased risk induced by capital adjustment costs does not a ect the
separation between quantities and asset prices in the RBC model, it is interesting to
investigate the e ects on the second moments of aggregate variables. With frictions on
capital adjustments, the cost of adjusting investment increases and, hence, the adjustment
when a shock hits the economy falls on consumption. This generates an increase in the
volatility of consumption along with a decrease in the volatility of investment (compare
columns (2) & (3) across Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5).
12I also consider other alternative specifications for the cost of adjustment function such „
!
It
Kt
"
=
a1 + a2(1≠÷)
1
It
Kt
≠ ”2
2(1≠÷)
and „
!
It
Kt
"
= ItKt +
÷
2
!
It
Kt
≠ ” ≠ eµ + 1"2 . In none of the cases the results
changed.
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Table 2.3: Business Cycle Statistics Changing 1/“ and ◊ for ÷ = 0
‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
Data 0.99 0.54 2.75 0.93 0.48 0.61 0.74
(0.06) (0.03) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Panel A: 1/“ = 1.5
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 1.03 0.51 2.53 0.41 0.98 0.99 0.99
(0.05) (0.03) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
100 1.03 0.50 2.45 0.41 0.98 0.99 0.99
(0.05) (0.03) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Panel B: 1/“ = 1
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 0.99 0.54 2.29 0.35 0.99 1.00 0.99
(0.05) (0.03) (0.12) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
100 0.99 0.54 2.21 0.35 0.99 1.00 0.99
(0.05) (0.03) (0.12) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Panel C: 1/“ = 0.2
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 0.83 0.69 1.33 0.12 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
100 0.83 0.69 1.28 0.11 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: the table shows second moments implied by the model for di erent values of IES, 1/“, and risk
aversion, ◊, for the model without capital adjustment costs, ÷ = 0. The rest of the parameters are
given in Table 2.1. Series in growth rates, and standard errors in parenthesis.
Hours worked also decrease their volatility when there are capital adjustment costs; for
instance, when a positive shock hits the economy the adjustment is smaller and so the
required increase in hours worked (compare column (4) across Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5).
Finally, it is interesting to note that the cross-correlation between output and consump-
tion, investment and hours worked, increase as the costs of adjustment in this economy
increase (compare columns (5), (6) & (7) across Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5).
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Table 2.4: Business Cycle Statistics Changing 1/“ and ◊ for ÷ = 0.2
Panel A: 1/“ = 1.5
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 0.88 0.64 1.53 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
100 0.88 0.64 1.52 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Panel B: 1/“ = 1
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 0.86 0.66 1.46 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
100 0.86 0.65 1.44 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Panel C: 1/“ = 0.2
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 0.80 0.72 1.05 0.06 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
100 0.80 0.72 1.04 0.06 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: the table shows second moments implied by the model for di erent values of IES, 1/“, and risk
aversion, ◊, for the model with low capital adjustment costs, ÷ = 0.2. The rest of the parameters are
given in Table 2.1. Series in growth rates, and standard errors in parenthesis.
2.3.1.1 Quantity dynamics
Qualitatively the business cycle dynamics of the model are the ones of the standard
stochastic growth model with permanent productivity shocks studied profusely in the
literature. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show the impulse response for selected macroeconomic
variables under the benchmark parameterization for three di erent values of the IES, and
the adjustment cost parameter.13
In response to a positive permanent productivity shock, consumption and investment
13Given that „ is chosen so that costs of adjustment are zero in steady state, the average adjustment
costs for ÷ = 0.2 are around 0.01% of output and for ÷ = 0.6 around 0.02% of output. In both cases the
numbers are very small.
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Table 2.5: Business Cycle Statistics Changing 1/“ and ◊ for ÷ = 0.6
Panel A: 1/“ = 1.5
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 0.79 0.72 0.98 0.05 1.00 1.00 0.98
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
100 0.79 0.72 0.97 0.05 1.00 1.00 0.98
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B: 1/“ = 1
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 0.79 0.73 0.96 0.05 1.00 1.00 0.98
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
100 0.79 0.73 0.95 0.04 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel C: 1/“ = 0.2
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y
1 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.98
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
100 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.98
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: the table shows second moments implied by the model for di erent values of IES, 1/“, and risk
aversion, ◊, for the model with high capital adjustment costs, ÷ = 0.6. The rest of the parameters are
given in Table 2.1. Series in growth rates, and standard errors in parenthesis.
jump as technology instantaneously adjusts to the new steady state. Investment and
hours worked immediately increase to the expectation of a permanently higher produc-
tivity in the future. Investment increases at the expense of current consumption. This
increase in capital stock allows agents to gradually increase (smoothly) consumption over
time towards the new steady state. Neither consumption, nor capital or output adjust in-
stantaneously, and the length of the adjustment process depends on preference parameters
(i.e. the IES and the discount factor), the capital adjustment costs, and the persistence
of the productivity shock.
The initial response of consumption is larger the lower the IES and the larger the adjust-
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ment costs in the economy consistent with the notion that the volatility of consumption
growth is decreasing in the IES, and increasing in the adjustment cost parameter ÷.14
Intuitively, agents with low IES prefer smooth consumption streams—they are strongly
averse to intertemporal substitution— and they adjust consumption on impact. Instead,
the initial response of investment is smaller for lower values of the IES. When there are
adjustment costs, the initial response of investment is smaller and for consumption larger.
Interestingly, in the case where adjustment costs are “too high” and the IES is “too low”
there is a countercyclical behavior of employment. As expected, the length of the adjust-
ment process is longer in the economy where agents have a lower IES and adjustment
costs are higher.
2.3.2 Asset returns
In this section I present results for the asset pricing implications of changing capital
adjustment costs. In a similar framework, Tallarini (2000) matches the Sharpe ratio
increasing the parameter of risk aversion. However, since his model lacks of capital
adjustment costs, he does so for a low equity return and standard deviation. Adding
capital adjustment costs tightens the comparison between the model prediction and the
observed data along these lines.
Table 2.6 reports population moments for the risk-free rate, the equity return, the equity
premium, and the Sharpe ratio for the excess return for di erent values of the IES and the
adjustment costs parameter. First, note that increasing risk aversion increases the equity
premium, decreasing both the equity return and (proportionally less) the risk-free rate.
Precautionary savings increase the mean capital stock, reducing the return on equity and
on the pure risk-free asset. The model with no adjustment costs and unity IES as in
Tallarini (2000), still delivers a very low equity premium even when the risk aversion rises
14See, for instance, (Jermann, 1998; Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer, 2010; Campanale et al., 2010).
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Response Functions for Macroeconomic Quantities: No Capital Ad-
justment Costs
Notes: the figure shows the impulse response functions for selected macroeconomic quantities in the model
without capital adjustment costs. The rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
to 100 (0.01% per quarter) (see rows (1) & (2) of Panel B in Table 2.6). The reason
behind the low equity premium is the low volatility in excess return: the only source of
variability in the model without adjustment costs is variation in the marginal product of
capital. With no frictions in the capital accumulation process the price of a unit of capital
is always constant at 1. Increasing risk aversion the only asset pricing fact Tallarini can
match is the Sharpe ratio.
Everything else equal, capital adjustment costs contribute to increase the mean excess
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Response Functions for Macroeconomic Quantities: ÷ = 0.2
Notes: the figure shows the impulse response functions for selected macroeconomic quantities in the model
with low capital adjustment costs, ÷ = 0.2. The rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
return (see column (5) from panels A, B and C from Table 2.6). For a given change in
the adjustment cost parameter, the resulting change in the risk-free rate as risk aversion
increases does not depend of capital adjustment costs. The return on equity, however,
exhibits a smaller decrease as risk aversion increases when the adjustment costs in the
economy are higher, causing an increase in the mean equity premium. In this specification,
where the price of capital is not constant, asset prices also exhibit an important amount
of variation.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions for Macroeconomic Quantities: ÷ = 0.6
Notes: the figure shows the impulse response functions for selected macroeconomic quantities in the model
with high capital adjustment costs, ÷ = 0.6. The rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
Further, a lower IES not only increases the mean of the risk-free rate and its volatility,
but also the mean equity return for any parameterization of the adjustment cost function
reducing the equity premium. In contrast to previous studies with habit preferences
(Jermann, 1998; Boldrin et al., 2001) or with Epstein-Zin preferences as (Campanale
et al., 2010), my results suggest that a rather high IES is needed to generate a reasonable
volatility of equity return, and a larger equity premium when there are adjustment costs
in the economy. Interestingly, a rather high IES is also needed in this type of models to
lower the volatility of the risk-free rate in order to match the data. A low IES implies the
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agent is highly averse to substituting consumption over time, increasing the volatility of
the marginal rate of substitution, producing an excessive risk-free rate variation.
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Table 2.6: Financial Statistics Changing 1/“, ◊ and ÷
◊ E(Rf ) ‡(Rf ) E(Re) ‡(Re) E(Re ≠Rf ) ‡(Re ≠Rf ) S.R.
Data 0.23 0.80 2.20 7.92 1.97 7.82 0.25
Panel A: 1/“ = 1.5
◊ E(Rf ) ‡(Rf ) E(Re) ‡(Re) E(Re ≠Rf ) ‡(Re ≠Rf ) S.R.
÷ = 0
1 1.11 0.09 1.11 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.01
100 0.98 0.08 0.99 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.26
÷ = 0.2
1 1.11 0.05 1.12 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.01
100 0.95 0.05 1.04 0.33 0.09 0.33 0.26
÷ = 0.6
1 1.12 0.03 1.12 0.61 0.01 0.61 0.01
100 0.93 0.03 1.10 0.61 0.16 0.61 0.27
Panel B: 1/“ = 1
◊ E(Rf ) ‡(Rf ) E(Re) ‡(Re) E(Re ≠Rf ) ‡(Re ≠Rf ) S.R.
÷ = 0
1 1.15 0.09 1.15 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.01
100 1.01 0.09 1.02 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.26
÷ = 0.2
1 1.15 0.05 1.15 0.3 0.00 0.32 0.01
100 0.98 0.05 1.06 0.32 0.08 0.32 0.26
÷ = 0.6
1 1.15 0.03 1.16 0.60 0.01 0.60 0.01
100 0.97 0.03 1.13 0.60 0.16 0.60 0.26
Panel C: 1/“ = 0.2
◊ E(Rf ) ‡(Rf ) E(Re) ‡(Re) E(Re ≠Rf ) ‡(Re ≠Rf ) S.R.
÷ = 0
1 1.56 0.10 1.56 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01
100 1.36 0.10 1.37 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.23
÷ = 0.2
1 1.56 0.08 1.56 0.26 0.00 0.25 0.01
100 1.34 0.08 1.40 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.25
÷ = 0.6
1 1.58 0.06 1.59 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.01
100 1.33 0.06 1.46 0.50 0.13 0.50 0.26
Notes: the table shows mean and standard deviation of returns implied by the model for a claim
to dividends and pure risk-free asset for di erent values of IES, 1/“, risk aversion, ◊, and capital
adjustment costs, ÷. The rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
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Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the impulse responses of asset returns for di erent
values of the IES and the costs of adjustment parameter. As expected, the dynamic of
the risk-free rate is dictated by the pattern of consumption growth showed in figures 2.1,
2.2, and 2.3. On impact the response of the risk-free rate is positive, but then it falls back
again as consumption transits towards the new steady state. In addition, the response
is higher for lower values of the IES independent whether there are costs of adjustment
to capital in the economy. As discussed before, a higher IES and larger adjustment costs
significantly increase the volatility of equity return and excess return. In contrast, when
there are no frictions in capital accumulation a rather low IES is required to generate a
higher volatility of equity return and of the risk premia.
The bottom-left panel of figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 reproduce the response of the price of
capital, i.e. the cost of redirecting the marginal unit from current consumption to capital
accumulation. In the model without capital adjustment costs, Tobin’s Q is always exactly
equal to 1 and the only source of variability in asset prices comes from the marginal prod-
uct of capital (see Figure 2.4). In contrast, with convex capital adjustment costs Tobin’s
Q depends on „Õ(·) and hence on investment dynamics. Given the costs of adjustment
function is concave, a higher investment rate implies a higher price of capital, and an
increase in the cost of transforming consumption into capital, increasing the volatility of
asset prices.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions for Financial Variables: No Capital Adjustment
Costs
Notes: the figure shows the impulse response functions for selected financial variables in the model without
capital adjustment costs. The rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Functions for Financial Variables: ÷ = 0.2
Notes: the figure shows the impulse response functions for selected financial variables in the model with
low capital adjustment costs, ÷ = 0.2. The rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions for Financial Variables: ÷ = 0.6
Notes: the figure shows the impulse response functions for selected financial variables in the model with
high capital adjustment costs, ÷ = 0.6. The rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.7 presents the volatility of dividend growth and its correlation with output growth.
Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 display dividends impulse response for the three calibrations of
the IES and the adjustment costs. Consistent with the results in Jermann (1998), for
low IES (equivalent to having habit formation) dividends are procyclical with capital
adjustment costs. Without capital adjustment costs they even turn to be countercyclical
on impact. In the case when the IES is greater or equal to unity, higher costs of adjustment
(i.e. ÷ = 0.6 in this case) are required for dividends to display a cyclical behavior on
impact. Intuitively, with adjustment costs the investment/capital ratio deviates less from
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its steady-state value leading to more procyclical dividends and a larger premia for payout
uncertainty.
Table 2.7: Dividends Changing 1/“, ◊ and ÷
◊ ‡(Div) flD,Y ‡(Div) flD,Y ‡(Div) flD,Y
1/“ = 0.2 1/“ = 1 1/“ = 1.5
÷ = 0
1 0.28 0.22 3.47 0.13 4.39 0.10
(0.03) (0.07) (0.30) (0.08) (0.39) (0.08)
100 0.36 0.24 4.17 0.13 5.31 0.10
(0.02) (0.07) (0.40) (0.08) (0.55) (0.08)
÷ = 0.2
1 0.26 -0.25 1.17 0.22 1.48 0.21
(0.02) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07)
100 0.21 -0.23 1.37 0.22 1.72 0.21
(0.03) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.18) (0.07)
÷ = 0.6
1 0.72 -0.30 0.24 -0.23 0.18 -0.19
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07)
100 0.71 -0.30 0.24 -0.25 0.18 -0.17
(0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08)
Notes: the table shows standard deviation of dividends and the correlation with output growth implied
by the model for di erent values of IES, 1/“, risk aversion, ◊, and capital adjustment costs, ÷. The rest
of the parameters are given in Table 2.1. Series in growth rates, and standard errors in parenthesis.
Usually in the literature equity market dividends are defined as a levered claim to output
such that DLEVt = Y ⁄t , where ⁄ > 1 is the leverage parameter. This, with the aim
of improving the fit of dividend growth volatility, the high equity return volatility and
the equity risk premium. For instance, with a leverage factor of 2 on the output claim,
the resulting equity return in the model with IES=1, no adjustment costs and a risk
aversion of 10 would be around 2.3% quarterly (instead of 1.1%), with a return volatility
of 0.8% (instead of 0.01%). In the same way, the response of the equity return, the equity
premium and dividends to a positive technology shock gets amplified substantially. There
is an important trade-o  between leverage and dividend growth volatility that should be
taken into account when calibrating this type of models (see Table 2.8).
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Table 2.8: Financial Statistics Changing ◊ and ÷ for 1/“ = 1
◊ E(Re,LEV ) ‡(Re,LEV ) E(Re,LEV ≠Rf ) ‡(Re,LEV ≠Rf ) ‡(DivLEV ) flDivLEV ,Y
÷ = 0
1 1.16 1.45 0.01 1.45 2.37 0.12
10 2.33 0.79 1.20 0.79 2.45 0.12
25 3.16 0.43 2.04 0.43 2.57 0.12
÷ = 0.2
1 1.16 1.65 0.01 1.65 0.32 0.00
10 2.36 1.25 1.23 1.25 0.32 0.01
25 3.24 1.06 2.13 1.06 0.32 0.05
÷ = 0.6
1 1.17 1.82 0.02 1.82 1.35 -0.28
10 2.39 1.70 1.26 1.71 1.39 -0.28
25 3.32 1.64 2.21 1.65 1.35 -0.28
Notes: the table shows mean and standard deviation of returns implied by the model for a claim on
levered output for di erent values of risk aversion, ◊, capital adjustment costs, ÷, and 1/“ = 1. The
rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
2.3.3 Predictability of asset returns
The empirical finance literature has widely documented that a series of variables are
capable of forecasting asset returns. If this is the case, then is must be true that expected
returns are not constant but vary over time.15 Moreover, these variables typically show
a strong correlation with the business cycle, i.e. expected returns tend to be higher
in recession and higher in economic booms. Therefore, if stock prices change because
expected returns change and not because expected future dividend growth changes, then
market movements must be related to macroeconomics through time-varying risk premia
rather than cash flows.
Table 2.9 reports the volatility of the time-varying equity premium for di erent values of
the IES, risk aversion and the elasticity of the cost of adjustment function. The results
show the model is incapable of generating economically significant time-variation in the
equity premium. In fact, even when we observe an increase in the volatility as risk aversion
15For a review of the literature see Cochrane (2007).
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increases and also as adjustment costs increase, in every case they are extremely low. In
this type of models, variability in expected returns is driven by the risk-free rate variation,
which is substantially lower than what is observed in the data.
Table 2.9: Expected Equity Premium Changing 1/“, ◊ and ÷
‡(Et[Re ≠Rf ])
No levarage With leverage
1/“ = 0.2 1/“ = 1 1/“ = 1.5 1/“ = 0.2 1/“ = 1 1/“ = 1.5
÷ = 0
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
25 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.001
100 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
÷ = 0.2
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
25 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000
100 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
÷ = 0.6
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
25 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
100 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
Notes: the table shows the standard deviation of the expected equity premium implied by the model
for di erent values of IES, 1/“, risk aversion, ◊, and capital adjustment costs, ÷. The rest of the
parameters are given in Table 2.1.
2.3.4 Time-Varying Risk Premia
In this section I investigate whether introducing some form of time-varying risk premia to
the standard real business cycle model presented in the previous section a ects consump-
tion, investment, output and employment dynamics. The aim is to investigate whether
Tallarini’s “separation theorem” still hold in this setting.
To allow for a time-varying risk premia I introduce changes in the conditional volatility of
productivity growth rates following the literature on long-run consumption risk (Bansal
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and Yaron, 2004). In particular, to account for economic uncertainty I model volatility of
TFP shocks as being time-varying. The dynamics for the TFP process now are represented
by
log zt+1 = µ+ log zt + ‡t+1Át+1 ≠ ‡
2
t+1
2 ,
‡t+1 = fl‡t + ‡wwt+1,
(2.19)
where wt+1 is standard normally distributed i.i.d random shocks and ‡t+1 represents the
time-varying economic uncertainty incorporated in the TFP growth.
Table 2.10 presents the standard deviations, cross-correlations and relative volatilities
of consumption, investment and hours worked with output for the modified model with
IES=1, ◊={1,10,100} and di erent values for the adjustment cost parameter. Clearly, in
this case the e ect of increased risk aversion on consumption, investment, hours worked
and output is significant, particularly for the case without adjustment costs in the econ-
omy. On the one hand, costs of adjustment contribute to increase the amount of risk
in the economy determining a di erent response for increased levels of risk aversion, but
on the other hand they restrict the degree of adjustment in the economy when a shock
hits. Hence, matching asset-pricing moments is not anymore just a matter of increasing
the degree of risk aversion, while maintaining the IES unchanged as in Tallarini (2000).
Quantity dynamics are a ected by the degree of risk aversion in the economy.
Not surprisingly, incorporating some form of time-varying risk premia also contributes
to improve the asset-pricing facts of the model. In the same way as before, increasing
risk aversion increases the equity premium, decreasing the equity return and the risk-free
rate. Even when for both calibrations of the model, no adjustment costs and ÷ = 0.2,
equity premium is still low, it is higher than in the benchmark model. Variation in
expected returns is not only driven by variation in the risk-free rate but also by the
stochastic volatility. The results in Table 2.11 shows that the modified model is capable
of generating economically significant time-variation in the equity premium.
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Table 2.10: Business Cycle Statistics Changing ◊ and ÷ for 1/“ = 1
◊ ‡(Y ) ‡(C) ‡(I) ‡(N) flC,Y flI,Y flN,Y ‡(C)‡(Y )
‡(I)
‡(Y )
‡(N)
‡(Y )
÷ = 0
1 1.08 0.59 2.52 0.39 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.55 2.32 0.36
(0.07) (0.04) (0.17) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
10 0.97 0.53 2.24 0.35 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.55 2.31 0.36
(0.06) (0.03) (0.15) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
100 1.13 0.64 2.69 0.47 0.90 0.96 0.90 0.56 2.38 0.42
(0.07) (0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
÷ = 0.2
1 0.91 0.69 1.54 0.17 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.76 1.69 0.19
(0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
10 0.93 0.70 1.57 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.76 1.69 0.19
(0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
100 0.94 0.71 1.60 0.20 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.75 1.71 0.21
(0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Notes: the table shows second moments implied by the model with time-varying risk premia for di erent
values of risk aversion, ◊ and capital adjustment costs, ÷ for 1/“ = 1. The rest of the parameters are
given in Table 2.1. Series in growth rates, and standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2.11: Financial Statistics Changing ◊ and ÷ for 1/“ = 1
Panel A: 1/“ = 1.5
◊ E(Rf ) ‡(Rf ) E(Re) ‡(Re) E(Re ≠Rf ) ‡(Re ≠Rf ) S.R. ‡(Et[Re ≠Rf ])
÷ = 0
1 1.14 0.09 1.14 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.000
10 1.13 0.09 1.13 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.000
100 0.97 0.10 0.98 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.27 0.004
÷ = 0.2
1 1.14 0.06 1.14 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.001
10 1.12 0.06 1.13 0.35 0.01 0.34 0.03 0.005
100 0.94 0.10 1.03 0.35 0.10 0.35 0.28 0.047
Notes: the table shows mean and standard deviation of returns implied by the model for a claim to
dividends and pure risk-free asset for di erent values of risk aversion, ◊, and capital adjustment costs,
÷ for 1/“ = 1. The rest of the parameters are given in Table 2.1.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the equilibrium e ects of convex capital adjustment costs on
quantity dynamics and asset prices when individuals have Epstein-Zin preferences. The
introduction of both features in an otherwise standard RBC is successful: the model can
account for the main statistical features of macroeconomic aggregate quantities, while at
the same generate a sizable risk premium, with the mean stock return and its standard
deviation in orders of magnitude closer to the data. Further, it is possible to obtain a
stable and rather low risk-free rate.
I also show that regardless of the calibration for the IES and the adjustment costs elas-
ticity, the behavior of aggregate quantities does not depend on attitudes towards risk.
Moreover, several calibrations for the costs of adjustment elasticity are analyzed and al-
ternative specifications for the cost of adjustment function are used, but in none of the
cases risk aversion has an e ect in quantity dynamics.
Despite the improvements of the model in terms of matching quantity dynamics and asset
returns, the model is incapable of generating economically significant time-variation in
risk premia and, consequently, replicate the predictability of excess returns as observed
in the data. I introduce changes in the conditional volatility of productivity growth rates
in the spirit of the literature of long-run consumption risk to allow for a time-varying
risk premia. In this case, the model’s asset-pricing predictions improve and when risk is
time-varying macroeconomic quantities are a ected by attitude towards risk.
86
A.1 Derivation stochastic discount factor
Appendix A.1 contains a short derivation of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) under
Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences.
To compute the stochastic discount factor in this economy:
Mt,t+1 =
ˆVt/ˆct+1
ˆVt/ˆct
, (1)
note that the derivative of the value function today with respect to the consumption
today:
ˆVt
ˆct
= (1≠ —)V “t v
(Cvt (1≠Nt)1≠v)1≠“
Ct
, (2)
and the derivative of the value function with respect to consumption tomorrow:
ˆVt
ˆct+1
= —V “t E[V 1≠◊t+1 ]
◊≠“
1≠◊ V ≠◊t+1
A
(1≠ —)V “t+1v
(Cvt+1(1≠Nt+1)1≠v)1≠“
Ct+1
B
. (3)
Note that in the last step I used the result regarding ˆVt/ˆct forwarded one period. Then,
canceling extra terms I get:
Mt,t+1 = —
3
Ct+1
Ct
4v(1≠“)≠1 31≠Nt+1
1≠Nt
4(1≠v)(1≠“)Qa Vt+1
Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
1
1≠◊
Rb“≠◊ . (4)
This equation shows how the pricing kernel is a ected by recursive preferences–as long
as the inverse of the IES coe cient “ is di erent from the risk aversion coe cient ◊ the
SDF will be a ected by this extra term.
In the limiting case when risk aversion ◊ = 1 the stochastic discount factor for the
economy can be computed following the same strategy. In this case, preferences for the
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representative agent will be given by
Vt =
1
(1≠ —)u(Ct, Nt)1≠“ + — exp((1≠ “)Et(log Vt+1))
2 1
1≠“ , (5)
with the per period utility function defined in the same way as before. “ Ø 0 is still
defined as the inverse of the IES Â over the consumption-leisure bundle, but now since
◊ = 1 the certainty equivalent of tomorrow’s utility term, Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
1
1≠◊ , collapses to
exp((1≠ “)Et(log Vt+1)). The same way as before, the pricing kernel of the economy can
be computed using the results for the derivative of the value function today with respect
to the consumption today:
ˆVt
ˆct
= (1≠ —)V “t v
(Cvt (1≠Nt)1≠v)1≠“
Ct
, (6)
and for the derivative of the value function with respect to consumption tomorrow:
ˆVt
ˆct+1
= —V “t exp ((1≠ “)Et[log Vt+1]) (1≠ —)V “≠1t+1 v
(Cvt+1(1≠Nt+1)1≠v)1≠“
Ct+1
. (7)
Then, canceling extra terms we have
Mt,t+1 = —
3
Ct+1
Ct
4v(1≠“)≠1 31≠Nt+1
1≠Nt
4(1≠v)(1≠“) 3 Vt+1
exp(Et[log Vt+1])
4“≠1
. (8)
A.1.1 Stochastic discount factor unity IES case
By definition when the IES Â over consumption-leisure bundle is restricted to equal one
as in Tallarini (2000), the parameter “ will also equal unity in the general specification
for preferences presented. In this case, preferences will be given by
Vt = u(Ct, Nt)1≠—Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
—
1≠◊ , (9)
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with the per period utility function given by u(C,N) = C‹(1 ≠ N)1≠‹ as before. The
risk aversion towards static gambles over the bundle is still determined by ◊ Ø 0. To
compute the SDF in this economy we follow the same approach–compute the derivative
of the value function today with respect to the consumption today as
ˆVt
ˆct
= (1≠ —) Vt
Ct
v, (10)
and the derivative of the value function with respect to consumption tomorrow using the
result in ˆVt/ˆct forwarded one period
ˆVt
ˆct+1
= (1≠ —) Vt
Ct+1
v—E[V 1≠◊t+1 ]≠1V 1≠◊t+1 . (11)
The SDF will be given by the formula
Mt,t+1 = —
3
Ct+1
Ct
4≠1 V 1≠◊t+1
Et(V 1≠◊t+1 )
. (12)
In the particular case when ◊ = 1 preferences collapse to the familiar expected utility
case. The utility function for the representative agent will be given by
Vt = u(Ct, Nt)1≠— exp (—Et[log Vt+1]) , (13)
with the per period utility function defined as before. Following the same approach
described before we end up with the old power formula from the standard stochastic
neoclassical growth model. Note that the derivative of the value function today with
respect to the consumption today is given by
ˆVt
ˆct
= (1≠ —)v Vt
Ct
, (14)
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and the derivative of the value function with respect to consumption tomorrow by
ˆVt
ˆct+1
= (1≠ —)— Vt
Ct+1
v. (15)
Thus, using these results the SDF will be given by the more familiar formula
Mt,t+1 = —
3
Ct+1
Ct
4≠1
. (16)
In this case, expected returns will be proportional to the covariance between returns
and consumption growth, with the risk aversion coe cient ◊ = 1 as the constant of
proportionality.
B.2 Computational method
Appendix B.2 contains a brief explanation of the computational method utilized to solve
the presented model. The computational method used to solve the model is exactly as in
Gourio (2012). In this section I will explain the numerical method in extent for both the
cases of permanent and transitory shocks, only for the more general case of preferences
and the case when the IES Â equals unity. The specific derivations required to solve the
model for the limiting case when risk aversion ◊ = 1, will be just stated in footnotes.
B.2.1 Permanent shocks
The modified Bellman equation for the stationary problem is:
g(k) = max
c,i,N
I
(1≠ —)(cv(1≠N)1≠v)1≠“ + —eµv(1≠“)
3
EÁÕ
5
e‡Á
Õv(1≠◊)g(kÕ)
1≠◊
1≠“
64 1≠“
1≠◊
J
,
(17)
90
subject to
c+ i = k–N1≠–
kÕ = (1≠”)k+„(
i
k )k
eµ+‡ÁÕ
Note that when the calibration indicates “ > 1 the max needs to be changed to a min
because we take a power 1/1 ≠ “. The numerical approximation to the solution of the
model is obtained as follows:
1. Discretize the space for the state and control variables: pick a grid for k,
i and the normal shock Á. Compute fi(Á) associated to each possible realization of
the shock in the grid. I used 120 points for the grid for k, 1,200 points for the grid
for i, and 10 points for the grid for Á.
2. Value function iteration:
(a) Compute for each k and i in the grid the value for N(k, i) that solves:
R(i, k) = max
N
(k–N1≠– ≠ i)‹(1≠“)(1≠N)(1≠‹)(1≠“) (18)
(b) Now that the state and action space are discrete this problem can be solved
as a standard discrete dynamic programming problem. The Bellman equation
can be written as
g(k) = max
i
Y][R(i, k) + —eµv(1≠“)
Aÿ
ÁÕ
fi(ÁÕ)e‡ÁÕv(1≠◊)g(kÕ(i, k, ÁÕ)
1≠◊
1≠“
B 1≠“
1≠◊
Z^
\ ,
(19)
subject to
kÕ = ((1≠ ”)k + „(
i
k )k)
eµ+‡ÁÕ
When computing the expectation term the value function will lie outside the
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grid thus the spline interpolation method is used to approximate it.16
3. Computing the value and policy functions: computed g, the value function for
the original non-stationary specification can be recovered V (K,Z) = Zvg(k), and
the policy functions for C = c(k)Z, I = i(k)Z, N = N(k) and Y = k–N(k)1≠–Z
can be computed.
4. Computing asset prices: for this purpose we first need to compute the SDF for
this economy. We know the SDF is given by equation (2) and using homogeneity,
the SDF between two states of the world s = (k) and s = (kÕ) can be expressed as
M(s, sÕ, ÁÕ) = —
1
ZÕc(kÕ)
Zc(k)
2v(1≠“)≠1 1 1≠N(kÕ)
1≠N(k)
2(1≠v)(1≠“)Qca ZÕvg(kÕ) 11≠“
EzÕ
1
ZÕv(1≠◊)g(kÕ)
1≠◊
1≠“
2 1
1≠◊
Rdb
“≠◊
= —
1
ZÕ
Z
2(“≠◊)v+v(1≠“)≠1 1
c(kÕ)
c(k)
2v(1≠“)≠1 1 1≠N(kÕ)
1≠N(k)
2(1≠v)(1≠“)
◊ ...
...
Qca g(kÕ) 11≠“
EzÕ
1
(ZÕZ )v(1≠◊)g(kÕ)
1≠◊
1≠“
2 1
1≠◊
Rdb
“≠◊
(20)
From here it is easy to obtain the price (return) of any asset with payo  d(kÕ, ÁÕ)
using the well-know asset pricing formula P (k) = EÁÕM(s, sÕ, ÁÕ)d(kÕ, ÁÕ)17.
16In the case when ◊ = 1 the stationary recursive formulation for this economy will be given by:
g(k) = max
i
)
(1≠ —)(cv(1≠N)1≠v)1≠“ + — exp !EÁÕ #log !exp((µ+ ‡ÁÕ)(1≠ “)v)g(kÕ)"$"* ,
subject to
c+ i = k–N1≠–
kÕ = (1≠”)k+„(
i
k )k
eµ+‡ÁÕ
.
Note that for the transformation we need to redefine V (K, z) = Z‹g(k)
1
1≠“
17In the limiting case when ◊ = 1, the SDF will be given by the derived equation in the previous section
of this appendix
M(s, sÕ, ÁÕ) = —
1
ZÕc(kÕ)
Zc(k)
2v(1≠“)≠1 1 1≠N(kÕ)
1≠N(k)
2(1≠v)(1≠“)Qa ZÕvg(kÕ) 11≠“
exp
1
EzÕ
Ë
log
1
ZÕvg(kÕ)
1
1≠“
2È2Rb“≠1
= —
1
ZÕ
Z
2≠1 1
c(kÕ)
c(k)
2v(1≠“)≠1 1 1≠N(kÕ)
1≠N(k)
2(1≠v)(1≠“)Qa g(kÕ) 11≠“
exp
1
EzÕ
Ë
log
1
(ZÕZ )vg(kÕ)
1
1≠“
2È2Rb“≠1
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(a) Using the formula the price for a one-period pure risk-free asset with d = 1 is
given by
P (k) = EÁÕM(s, sÕ, ÁÕ)
=
Qca —qÁÕ fi(ÁÕ)e((“≠◊)v+v(1≠“)≠1)(µ+‡ÁÕ)c(kÕ)v(1≠“)≠1 ◊ ...
(1≠N(kÕ))(1≠v)(1≠“)g(kÕ) “≠◊1≠“
Rdb
c(k)v(1≠“)≠1(1≠N(k))(1≠v)(1≠“)
3q
ÁÕ fi(ÁÕ)ev(1≠◊)(µ+‡Á
Õ)g(kÕ)
1≠◊
1≠“
4 “≠◊
1≠◊
(21)
Then, the risk-free asset return is simply Rf (k) = 1P (k) .
(b) The price of a claim to the representative firm’s stream of dividends {Dt} can
be computed similarly using the standard formula. Define Dt = Yt≠wtNt≠ It
and let Pt denote the price of this equity which satisfies the standard recursion
Pt = Et(Mt,t+1(Pt+1 +Dt+1)) (22)
Given that dividends can be expressed asD = Zd(k), where d(k) = –k–N1≠–≠
i, the firm value recursion can be written as P = Zf(k) with
f(k) = EsÕ|s
3
M(sÕ, s)◊ (Z
Õ
Z
)(d(kÕ) + f(kÕ))
4
(23)
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Using the expression for the SDF,
f(k) = —EÁÕ
SWWWWWWWU
(ZÕZ )(“≠◊)v+v(1≠“)(
c(kÕ)
c(k) )v(1≠“)≠1(
1≠N(kÕ)
1≠N(k) )(1≠v)(1≠“) ◊ ...Qccca g(kÕ)
1
1≠“
EÁÕ
3
(ZÕZ )v(1≠◊)g(kÕ)
1≠◊
1≠“
4 1
1≠◊
Rdddb
“≠◊
(d(kÕ) + f(kÕ))
TXXXXXXXV
=
Qca —qÁÕ fi(ÁÕ)e((“≠◊)v+v(1≠“))(µ+‡ÁÕ)c(kÕ)v(1≠“)≠1◊
(1≠N(kÕ))(1≠v)(1≠“)g(kÕ) “≠◊1≠“ (d(kÕ) + f(kÕ))
Rdb
c(k)v(1≠“)≠1(1≠N(k))(1≠v)(1≠“)(q
ÁÕ fi(ÁÕ)ev(1≠◊)(µ+‡Á
Õ)g(kÕ)
1≠◊
1≠“ )
“≠◊
1≠◊
Then, the equity return can be calculated as
Ret,t+1 = Pt+1+Dt+1Pt
= Zt+1Zt
f(kt+1)+d(kt+1)
f(kt)
To solve the recursion we have to iterate until convergence starting from an
initial guess for instance f(k) = 0.18To compute the price of the leveraged
claim (i.e. claim to the levered output), define DLEVt = Y ⁄t and let Pt denote
the price of this levered equity satisfying the standard price recursion. Note
that dividends can now be written as D = Z⁄d(k), and so the firm value
recursion as P = Z⁄f(k) with
f(k) = EsÕ|s
3
M(sÕ, s)◊ (Z
Õ
Z
)⁄(d(kÕ) + f(kÕ))
4
. (24)
5. Simulation. The model statistics are obtained by simulating 1,000 samples of
length 400, starting from an arbitrary guess for capital, and cutting the first 200
periods in each sample.
18This same formulations can be used to compute asset prices in the limiting case when ◊ = 1 just
by using the appropriate expression for the SDF as derived in the first section of this appendix and the
corresponding transformation for the original value function V (K,Z).
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B.2.1.1 Computational method in the unity IES case
In the case when IES equals unity the computational method is exactly the same explained
previously in this appendix. For this reason I just present briefly the key formulations
required to solve the model. The stationary recursive formulation for this economy is
given by
log g(k) = maxi{(1≠ —)(v log c+ (1≠ v) log(1≠N))+
—
1≠◊ log
1
EÁÕev(1≠◊)(µ+‡Á
Õ)g(kÕ)1≠◊
2
},
(25)
subject to
c+ i = k–N1≠–,
kÕ = (1≠”)k+„(
i
k )k
eµ+‡ÁÕ .
where g satisfies V (K,Z) = Zvg(k) and all the non-stationary variables have been de-
trended by the stochastic technology level Z.19
In the same way as before, to compute asset prices in this economy we first need to
calculate the SDF. Using the derived expression and homogeneity, the pricing kernel
between two states of the world s = (k) and s = (kÕ) can be expressed as
M(s, sÕ, ÁÕ) = —
1
ZÕc(kÕ)
Zc(k)
2≠1 ZÕv(1≠◊)g(kÕ)1≠◊
EÁÕ(ZÕv(1≠◊)g(kÕ)1≠◊)
= —
1
ZÕ
Z
2(1≠◊)v≠1 1 c(kÕ)
c(k)
2≠1 3 g(kÕ)1≠◊
EÁÕ
!
(ZÕZ )v(1≠◊)g(kÕ)1≠◊
"4 .
Next, using the standard asset pricing formula Pt = Et(Mt,t+1(Pt+1 + Dt+1)) we can
compute the price/return on the risk-free asset and on the equity claim.20
19In the case when ◊ = 1 the stationary recursive formulation for this economy will be given by
log g(k) = max
i
Ó
(1≠ —) (v log c+ (1≠ v) log(1≠N)) + —EÁÕ log
1
g(kÕ)ev(µ+‡Á
Õ)
2Ô
subject to
c+ i = k–N1≠–
kÕ = (1≠”)k+„(
i
k )k
eµ+‡ÁÕ
.
Note that for the transformation we need to redefine V (K,Z) = Z‹g(k).
20In the limiting case when ◊ = 1, the SDF will be given by the expression derived in the previous
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The price on the risk-free asset with payout d = 1 will be given by
P (k) = EÁÕM(s, sÕ, ÁÕ)d(kÕ, Z Õ, ÁÕ)
=
Ó
—
q
ÁÕ fi(Á
Õ)e((1≠◊)v≠1)(µ+‡ÁÕ)c(kÕ)≠1g(kÕ)1≠◊
Ô
c(k)≠1
q
ÁÕ fi(ÁÕ)ev(1≠◊)(µ+‡Á
Õ)g(kÕ)1≠◊ .
Similarly, the equity is simply a claim to the representative firm’s stream of dividends
{Dt}. Let Dt = Yt ≠ wtNt ≠ It and Pt denote the price of this equity satisfying the
standard asset pricing formula. Given that dividends can be expressed as D = Zd(k),
where d(k) = –k–N1≠– ≠ i, the firm value recursion can be written as P = Zf(k) with
f(k) = EsÕ|s
1
M(sÕ, s)◊ (ZÕZ )(d(kÕ) + f(kÕ))
2
= —EÁÕ
5
(ZÕZ )(1≠◊)v(
c(kÕ)
c(k) )≠1
3
g(kÕ)1≠◊
EÁÕ
!
(ZÕZ )v(1≠◊)g(kÕ)1≠◊
"4 (d(kÕ) + f(kÕ))6 .
or equivalently,
f(k) =
Ó
—
q
ÁÕ fi(Á
Õ)e(1≠◊)v(µ+‡ÁÕ)c(kÕ)≠1g(kÕ)1≠◊(d(kÕ)+f(kÕ))
Ô
c(k)≠1
q
ÁÕ fi(ÁÕ)ev(1≠◊)(µ+‡Á
Õ)g(kÕ)1≠◊ .
Again, this same formulations can be used to compute asset prices (including the levered
claim to output) in the limiting case when ◊ = 1 using the appropriate expression for the
SDF as derived in the first section of this appendix and the corresponding transformation
for the original value function V (K,Z).
section of this appendix
M(s, sÕ, ÁÕ) = —
1
ZÕc(kÕ)
Zc(k)
2≠1
= —
1
ZÕ
Z
2≠1 1
c(kÕ)
c(k)
2≠1
Chapter 3
Do Firm-Level Shocks Generate Aggregate Fluctuations?: A
Cross-Country Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Business cycle fluctuations are often thought to have caused by aggregate shocks, since
uncorrelated sector- or firm-level shocks average out in the aggregate due to the law of
large numbers. However, a number of studies in recent years show the diversification of id-
iosyncratic shocks breaks down when sectoral linkages or firm size distributions are highly
skewed. These studies provide the insight that in an economy where few sectors serve
as major input suppliers or few firms account for a disproportionate share of production,
shocks to these sectors or firms can propagate to generate aggregate fluctuations.
While the sector-based story has a long theoretical tradition accompanied by empirical
evidence,1 the relevance of firm-level shocks to aggregate fluctuations remains to be ac-
knowledged and quantified. Gabaix (2011) was the first study to formally show that in
an economy with fat-tailed size distribution of firms, idiosyncratic shocks to firms diver-
sify at a milder rate that leads to nontrivial e ects on aggregate fluctuations. Further,
output volatility originated from micro-shocks is an increasing function of the Herfindahl
1Sector-based stories date back to the seminal work of Long and Plosser (1983) where they show
input-output linkages can propagate sector-level shocks within a six-sector dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model. Later on, Dupor (1999) discredits this view arguing that the results rely on the
number of sectors being too small. Around the same time Horvath (1998, 2000) argues the cancellation of
sector-specific shocks is a ected by the existence of factor demand linkages; whether shocks diversify does
not depend on the number of sectors, but whether some of them are important inputs in the production
processes of many others. Recently, Acemoglu et al. (2012) generalize Horvath’s view and show that if
there are only few input supplier sectors then the convergence of aggregate volatility to zero slows down
considerably. A productivity shock in one major sector has a “cascading” e ects in the economy, a ecting
this way not only the direct downstream sectors but also the series of interconnected sectors.
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index of firms’ sales shares, or in other words, of how concentrated the economy is.2 The
theoretical framework is then accompanied by an empirical analysis where the author
shows shocks to largest firms in the US statistically explains GDP growth over the period
1952-2008.
In light of Gabaix’s theory, countries that are more concentrated than the US should
observe stronger e ects of firm-level shocks on aggregate fluctuations. However, since
the theory is relatively new and comprehensive panel data are not readily available for
many countries, studies investigating the e ects of idiosyncratic shocks outside the US
are scarce.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the relevance of idiosyn-
cratic shocks to output fluctuations for three OECD countries (Germany, Canada and the
UK) in addition to the US. Figure 3.1a presents the relative size of the top 100 firms in
terms of their sales to GDP ratio in these four economies, and Figure 3.1b the Herfindahl
index of firms’ sales share among the largest 100 firms. Comparing with the US, the top
100 firms in other countries not only account for a larger share of their corresponding
GDP, they are also much more concentrated. These descriptive statistics suggest large
firms in these countries could be an important source of variability, and the e ects of
idiosyncratic shocks on the aggregate should be stronger as a result.
To assess the empirical relevance of idiosyncratic shocks for output fluctuations in these
countries, we regress the growth of GDP per capita on the “granular residual” and its
di erent lags. The granular residual (GR), proposed by Gabaix (2011), is a transparent
statistic that summarizes the importance of firm idiosyncratic shocks using the weighted
sum of firm-level shocks, where the weights are calculated as the firms’ sales to GDP
ratio to reflect their relative importance. This empirical strategy allows us to work with
2The results in Gabaix (2011) only require economies with su ciently large herfindahls. The central
case of firms’ size being Zipf-distributed is justified because of its tractability and clean exposition. Also,
this distribution generates very high herfindahls.
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a broader sample of countries as we do not require input-output matrices to measure the
importance of firm-level productivity shocks for the economy, only annual firms’ sales and
employment, and countries’ GDP per capita are necessary.3
Figure 3.1: Relative Size and Degree of Concentration of Top 100 Firms by Country
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Notes: the figure presents the relative size of the top 100 firms in terms of their sales to GDP ratio in the
US, Germany, the UK and Canada (on the left), and the Herfindahl index of firms’ sales share among the
largest 100 firms in these same countries (on the right).
Our results show that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms are of little relevance in the UK
or Canada but explain roughly 1/3 of the output fluctuations in the US and Germany.
The top ranking firms are indeed the most important contributors to granular e ects,
but because diversification is at work still in the UK and Canada these firms are not
able to explain GDP growth. Initial investigation seems to confirm the conjecture that
a strong transportation sector drives the granular e ects in the US and Germany. Our
results suggests that while firm size distribution is found to be highly skewed in many
economies4, the ability of the largest firms to transmit shocks may not be universal and
thus not to be taken for granted.
3Despite using an empirical strategy that is lenient on data requirements, we still face some data
limitations along the time-series dimension. In the end, we are able to construct the GR using the top
100 firms for at least 20 years for all of our countries.
4Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012) find in a set of 43 countries, firm size distributions are highly
skewed and on average close to Zipf.
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The studies closest to ours are Di Giovanni et al. (2014) and Foerster et al. (2011); both
studies investigate the importance of firm level shocks, but they focus on one country
each and di er in methodology. While the first finds support for the hypothesis that
microeconomic shocks drive aggregate fluctuations, like ours the second paper casts doubts
on the validity of this hypothesis. Using detailed French firm level data, Di Giovanni et al.
(2014) find firm-specific shocks to be almost twice as important as the combined e ect of
sectoral and macroeconomics shocks in driving aggregate sales growth. Further, they find
that most of the e ect is not coming directly from shocks to individual firms, but input-
output linkages. Foerster et al. (2011) uses factor methods to decompose US industrial
production and explore the plausibility of the granular- and network-origins hypothesis of
aggregate fluctuations. They find no support for the granular hypothesis, and aggregate
volatility is better explained by co-variability among sectors. Furthermore, co-variability
is explained by common factors, very little of which is the result of the transmission via
input-output linkages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the empirical specifi-
cation used to estimate the importance of firm-level idiosyncratic shocks. In Section 3.3
we present the regression results for the countries in our sample, and in Section 3.4 we
deconstruct the di erences in the findings for the US and Germany versus those for the
UK and Canada. Finally our conclusions are summarized in Section 3.5.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we first summarize the theoretical framework from which the GR is derived
and how to construct it. We then specify the empirical strategy and describe the data.
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3.2.1 Granular residual
In an economy with input-output linkages and endogenous input response, aggregate
productivity growth is a weighted sum of firms’ Hicks-neutral productivity shocks, Ái:
gTFP =
ÿ
i
sales of firm i
GDP
Ái, (3.1)
where the weights qi sales of firm iGDP capture the propagation e ect from firm-level shocks to
the rest of the economy. Domar (1961) and Hulten (1978) show that these are the appro-
priate weights to measure the total e ect of firm-level productivity changes on aggregate
productivity. The intuition is that an increase in productivity in one firm increases output
in all those other firms that use this final good as an intermediate input, which in turn
increases output again, and so on.
Without disturbances, growth in GDP is proportional to the growth in TFP:
gGDP = µ gTFP , (3.2)
where µ Ø 1 is the factor usage intensity that is a combination of the elasticity of substi-
tution of labor and output elasticities with respect to production inputs.5
Combining (3.1) and (3.2), the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on aggregate output is
captured by the following relationship:
gGDP = µ
ÿ
i
sales of firm i
GDP
Ái, (3.3)
5Consider an economy with the production technology Y = AtL–t and consumer preference Ut(Ct, Lt) =
log(Ct ≠ L
1+1/„
t
1+1/„ ). With competitive markets for output and labor, the equilibrium is characterized by
Nt = (–At)
1
1+1/„≠– and Yt = –A
1+1/„
1+1/„≠–
t . In this economy, output growth is proportional to TFP growth
Yˆ = µAˆ, where µ = 1+1/„1+1/„≠– is the factor usage.
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where  ú =qi sales of firm iGDP Ái is Gabaix’s “granular residual”. Equation (3.3) provides the
basis for the regression framework to test the granular hypothesis: granular e ects are said
to be present when the weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks to large firms statistically
explains GDP fluctuations as measured by growth in GDP per capita.
Intuitively, in an economy where shocks are uncorrelated across firms and all of them
have the same variance, from equation (3.3) we see that output growth volatility from
micro-shocks reduces to a function of the firms’ sales herfindahl:
‡GDP = µ‡h; h =
A
Nÿ
i=1
3
Sit
Yt
42B1/2
, (3.4)
where h is the modified Herfindahl (Herfindahl1/2) of the economy. Hence, the more
fat-tailed is the firm-size distribution or, the higher the firms’ sales herfindahl, larger is
the e ect on aggregate volatility of firm-level shocks. For instance, if firm size is Zipf-
distributed, output growth volatility is proportional to ‡/lnN , and not only it does not
converge to zero as N goes to infinity, but the rate of decay is much lower. Instead,
if all the firms are of equal size, output growth volatility in a country with N firms is
proportional to ‡/
Ô
N , and so as N goes to infinity output volatility converges to zero.6
The only detailed calculation of this empirical strategy is the construction of firm level
shocks. To avoid data availability issues, we also estimate firm-level productivity using
labor productivity of firm i:7
zi = ln
sales of firm i in year t
# of workers in firm i in year t . (3.5)
To compute the shocks to firms’ productivity growth, we model firms’ labor productivity
6See Gabaix (2011) for a detailed proof.
7We implement the Olley and Pakes (1996) method to estimate the firm-level Solow residual and
contrast it with our measure of labor productivity. We find that the two methods yield similar estimates
for the productivity growth in the US.
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growth, g, as depending on a set of firm’s characteristics, Xijt, and an idiosyncratic shock,
Áijt:
gijt = —ÕXijt + Áijt. (3.6)
For simplicity, we use year and industry dummies to proxy for firm’s characteristics:
git = c+ dt + Áit (3.7)
gijt = c+ dt + INDjt + Áijt, (3.8)
and calculate firm level shocks as the demeaned labor productivity growth rates, where the
mean is computed over all firms of the year (the case when we use only year dummies),
or of the year and industry (when both year and industry dummies are used in the
regressions).8
Using both estimations for the idiosyncratic shocks, we construct two versions of the
“granular residual”:
 t,v1 =
K=100ÿ
i=1
Si,t≠1
Yt≠1
Áˆit;  t,v2 =
K=100ÿ
i=1
Si,t≠1
Yt≠1
Áˆijt. (3.9)
Since we are interested in the e ect of the largest firm we only work with the largest top
K = 100 firms ranked by their sales to output ratio in the previous period.9
8The challenge with correctly identifying Áit remains apparent as in the data it is hard to identify
Áit because aggregate shocks could cause firm i’s volatility or reflect it. We do not directly address the
reflection problem but we perform robustness checks to also control for the common factors so to prove
the explanatory power of the GR is not coming from aggregate shocks (e.g. oil, monetary, fiscal policy
shocks and etc).
9To verify the empirical methodology we simulated a simple economy, with exogenous production
and without linkages. With the true idiosyncratic shocks, we construct the GR and regress output on
this measure. The empirical strategy tends to bias the GR downwards in its magnitude and volatility,
decreasing its explanatory power. Further, it seems to capture well the idiosyncratic components of a
firm’s productivity growth in a granular world without inducing any spurious bias. Interestingly, the
results also show that the explanatory power of the model decreases when the idiosyncratic shocks to
large firms are less volatile.
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3.2.2 Econometric specification
To test for the e ect of firm-level idiosyncratic shocks on aggregate fluctuations we regress
our measure of idiosyncratic shocks,  , on growth of GDP per capita using the following
specification:
gYt = –+
2ÿ
i=0
µi t≠i + ut. (3.10)
The R-squared from regressing GDP growth gYt on  t and its di erent lags allows one to
assess the extent to which idiosyncratic shocks explain the variability of GDP growth. If
we recall equation (3.3), the coe cient on the granular residual provides an estimation of
the factor usage in these di erent countries.10
3.2.3 Data
Firm-level data for the US and Canada, UK and Germany are from Compustat North
America, Computstat Global. The length of coverage varies and it spans from 1950 to
present and from 1987 to present for NA and international companies. We keep only
firms incorporated and headquartered in their home country so to exclude foreign firms
to the best of our ability. The oil industry is excluded due to di culty in teasing out real
firm-level shocks from the aggregate commodity price shocks.11 Figure 3.2 summarizes
the number of firms with valid data required by our regression specification by country
and year.
10Gabaix (2011) takes µ = 2.6 as the benchmark to compare the regression coe cient with for the US.
11We also exclude financial firms as in Gabaix (2011), “because the nature of their sales are not in line
with the meaning of ‘gross output’ in the paper”.
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Figure 3.2: Number of Firms With Valid Sales and Employee Data
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The advantage of using Compustat is the comparability of information reported across
countries, but the coverage on the number of firms is limited in Germany and Canada
for some of the years. Further, since the analysis is done over the top 100 firms in the
economy we lose additional observations because for some years there are less than 100
firms. However, since sales of the top 50 and 100 firms as a percentage of GDP track each
other closely for Germany and Canada, we restrict our samples to years with at least 50
rather than 100 firms. This means for years less than 100 (but more than 50) firms we
use all firms in our empirical exercises.
Macroeconomic data (GDP, GDP per capita and GDP deflators) are taken from the
World Bank’s Development Indicators database. GDP deflators are used to convert sales
into real terms.12 Some of the sales figures in Compustat are denominated in non-local
currencies, and we look to the respective country’s central bank website to obtain the
exchange rates.13
12Ideally one would like to use industry production indexes but they are not readily available so we use
GDP deflators instead.
13This could introduce potential measurement errors since the exchange rates were matched to the fiscal
years, rather than the period covered by a firm’s financial statements.
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3.3 Estimation Results
In this section, we begin by presenting some basic statistics of the variables used in the
regressions. Then, we present the estimation results for the US and Canada, UK and
Germany as specified in regression (3.10) for di erent lags for the GR.
Table 3.1 provides a summary of country characteristics in terms of the variables used in
the regression model. The average and the volatility of per capita GDP growth across the
countries are very similar (columns 1 and 2), but firm-level productivity growth is much
more volatile in non-US countries (column 4). Column 5 shows the correlation between
growth rates across firms is small for all of the countries, suggesting the measure we use
for firm level shock does capture idiosyncratic variation to the firms. Finally, the average
and standard deviation of the GR are smaller for version 2 than for 1 (columns 6 and 7
for version 1 and 8 and 9 for version 2). This shows when we demean by year-industry,
we further get rid of industry-specific shocks that could confound our results.
Table 3.1: Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
µgY ‡gY µÁ ‡Á flÁi,Áj µ v1 ‡ v1 µ v2 ‡ v2
US 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.110 0.023 0.0003 0.0037 0.0003 0.0032
Canada 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.208 0.016 0.0006 0.0055 -0.0001 0.0044
Germany 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.179 0.020 0.0034 0.0092 -0.0001 0.0072
UK 0.019 0.022 0.011 0.258 0.010 0.0031 0.0144 -0.0016 0.0081
Notes: µgY is the average annual per capita GDP growth; ‡gY is the standard deviation of annual
per capita GDP growth; µÁ is the average annual firm-level productivity shocks; ‡Á is the standard
deviation of annual firm-level productivity shocks; flgi,gj is the average annual sample correlation of
firm-level productivity shocks; µ v1 is the average annual granular residual with year-demeaning; ‡ v1
is the standard deviation of the annual granular residual; µ v2 is the standard deviation of the annual
granular residual with industry demeaning; ‡ v2 is the standard deviation of annual granular residual
with industry demeaning.
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3.3.1 Impact of idiosyncratic firm-level shocks
Table 3.2 presents the regression results for the US, Germany, the UK and Canada.
Taking the US as the benchmark, we see in columns (1) & (2) of Panel A that the granular
residual explains 24% (35%) of the fluctuations in GDP growth using 1 (2) lag(s) when
demeaning by year. When we control for the contemporaneous granular residual and its
two lags, their coe cients are significant and hovering around 2.6—the theoretical value
of µ Gabaix (2011) uses for comparison. The presence of granular e ects is confirmed in
these results.
When we control for industry-year specific shocks by demeaning at the 2-digit industry
level, we observe an increase in the granular e ects for the US in Panel B columns (1) &
(2) of the same table. The resulting firm idiosyncratic shocks are closer to the true Áit
when industry specific shocks are controlled for, hence if the granular hypothesis holds
we should expect to explain more of GDP fluctuations.14
The results for the other countries are mixed. For Germany, we find the GR to explain
GDP fluctuations even better than for the US (35% (36%) when demeaning by year,
and 24% (34%) when demeaning by year-industry). However, regardless of demeaning
the GR by year or industry, we do not find granular e ects in Canada or the UK. The
adjusted R2 is essentially zero and the coe cients are insignificant and often negative.
Even though all countries meet the su cient conditions, we find idiosyncratic shocks
translate to aggregate fluctuations only in the US and Germany.
The natural progression at this point is to implement factor methods to examine whether
any residual common shocks give rise to our findings, and to use principal component
14We also experimented with demeaning at the 3-digit and 4-digit level but the granular e ects are
weakened as a result. Increasing the level of disaggregation should improve the explanatory power further
theoretically but at the same time inducing attenuation bias empirically because the mean would then be
estimated with fewer firms. These two forces work against each other and complicate the interpretations
of the regression results, hence we focus on year and year-industry at the 2-digit level demeaning in this
paper as mentioned in the Introduction.
107
Table 3.2: Explanatory Power of the Granular Residual
Panel A: GR with Year Demeaning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA Germany UK Canada
 t 1.83úú 2.51úúú 1.19úú 0.93úú 0.08 -0.00 -0.22 -0.37
(0.69) (0.69) (0.42) (0.44) (0.32) (0.35) (0.58) (0.60)
 t≠1 2.58úúú 2.88úúú 1.00úú 1.15úú 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.55
(0.71) (0.67) (0.43) (0.43) (0.32) (0.34) (0.58) (0.59)
 t≠2 2.13úúú -0.23 -0.14 0.02
(0.71) (0.44) (0.34) (0.59)
Intercept 0.02úúú 0.02úúú 0.01 0.01 0.01úúú 0.02úúú 0.02úúú 0.02úúú
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 56 55 21 20 22 21 48 47
R2 0.27 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03
adj. R2 0.24 0.35 0.35 0.36 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04
Panel B: GR with Year-Industry at the 2-digit Level Demeaning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA Germany UK Canada
 t 2.79úúú 3.70úúú -0.04 0.00 0.21 0.00 -0.29 -0.57
(0.76) (0.78) (0.61) (0.55) (0.61) (0.68) (0.70) (0.72)
 t≠1 3.34úúú 3.92úúú 1.60úú 1.95úúú 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.78
(0.74) (0.71) (0.60) (0.58) (0.59) (0.64) (0.70) (0.70)
 t≠2 2.07úúú 0.48 -0.24 0.32
(0.75) (0.55) (0.61) (0.70)
Intercept 0.02úúú 0.02úúú 0.01úúú 0.01úúú 0.02úúú 0.02úúú 0.02úúú 0.02úúú
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 56 55 21 20 22 21 48 47
R2 0.37 0.48 0.31 0.44 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.05
adj. R2 0.35 0.45 0.24 0.34 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02
Notes: * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. Per capita
GDP growth is regressed on the granular residual with year demeaning (Panel A), and 2-digit industry
demeaning (Panel B) calculated over the top 100 firms.
analysis to investigate which firms explain the aggregate fluctuations the most. However,
since the identities of the largest firms change from year to year, we cannot use conven-
tional methods to examine whether our findings are driven by common factors or specific
firms. Thus in the next section we deconstruct our findings utilizing still the GR measure
demeaned at the industry level, since this level of demeaning yields the most robust proxy
for idiosyncratic shock as shown in Table 3.1.
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3.4 Deconstructing the empirical results
We first examine the relative importance of top ranking firms amongst themselves in
explaining GDP fluctuations. Since the ranking of these top firms changes every year, we
drop observations that have the same ranking to construct the new GR. The results are
presented in Figure 3.3 where we drop a top ranked “composite firm” one at a time and
plot the percentage reduction in adjusted-R2’s against its average weights over the sample
period. The figure shows lower ranks bunched together around zero in all four countries,
suggesting their relative importance is small. However, the impact of the largest firms is
prominent in all countries with the starkest contrast in the case of the US.
Figure 3.3: Reduction in Adjusted-R2 After Dropping Top Ranked Firms
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Notes: the figure plots the percentage reduction in adjusted-R2’s from dropping one at a time a top ranked
“composite firm” against its average weights over the sample period. The identity of the “composite firm”
changes every year as the ranking of the top firms also does.
In light of this finding, we construct the granular residual with just the top 10 ranks to
find that the positive findings in the US and Germany can be explained just as well (see
Panel A in Table 3.3). Panel B in the same table additionally shows dropping top 10 ranks
reduces the explanatory power significantly and the coe cients are no long significant. In
the UK and Canada, however, firms of the same ranks did not play a significant role and
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dropping them leaves the R2 as low as before and the coe cients remain insignificant.15
Since summing up the GRs for the top ranks dilute their explanatory power in the UK
and Canada, we suspect the diversification mechanism may be at work still in these two
countries.
Table 3.3: Explanatory Power of the Modified Granular Residual
Panel A: GR With Only the Top 10 Ranks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA Germany UK Canada
 t 2.71úúú 3.30úúú -0.01 0.01 0.24 0.17 -0.46 -0.65
(0.74) (0.74) (0.67) (0.62) (0.90) (0.91) (0.69) (0.71)
 t≠1 3.03úúú 3.34úúú 1.77úú 2.03úúú 0.99 1.14 0.40 0.39
(0.72) (0.70) (0.66) (0.64) (0.88) (0.92) (0.69) (0.70)
 t≠2 1.77úú 0.30 -0.92 0.44
(0.73) (0.62) (0.88) (0.70)
Intercept 0.02úúú 0.02úúú 0.01úúú 0.01úú 0.02úúú 0.02úú 0.02úúú 0.02úúú
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 56 55 21 20 22 21 48 47
R2 0.36 0.44 0.30 0.40 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.04
adj. R2 0.34 0.41 0.22 0.29 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
Panel B: GR without the top 10 ranks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA Germany UK Canada
 t -1.92 -1.90 -4.34 -3.76 0.23 -0.11 0.50 0.25
(2.50) (2.53) (3.10) (3.09) (1.13) (1.58) (1.33) (1.34)
 t≠1 -0.12 -0.33 2.39 3.58 0.81 0.94 0.97 1.37
(2.49) (2.56) (3.12) (3.54) (1.13) (1.52) (1.32) (1.34)
 t≠2 -2.07 1.03 0.43 -0.85
(2.54) (3.09) (1.26) (1.33)
Intercept 0.02úúú 0.02úúú 0.01 0.01 0.01úúú 0.02úú 0.02úúú 0.02úúú
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 56 55 21 20 22 21 48 47
R2 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.25 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
adj. R2 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 0.11 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04
Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. In Panel A, per capita GDP
growth is regressed on the granular residuals calculated over the top 10 ranks. In Panel B, per capita
GDP growth is regressed on the granular residuals calculated over the top 91-100 firms.
15This conclusion is robust to dropping the top 15 ranks.
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To further examine where the di erences in the contribution of top firms with comparable
importance could be coming from, we construct the rank specific weighted idiosyncratic
shock and plot its correlation with GDP growth in Figure 3.4.16 The right column of the
figure shows unambiguously that the top ranks in Germany and the US are also positively
correlated with GDP growth, but the picture is much more nuanced for Canada and the
UK. We conclude that the higher tendency of high ranking firms moving in opposite
directions in the UK and Canada neutralizes the e ect of idiosyncratic shocks, thus it is
not surprising the final measure of granular residual–the sum–do not explain aggregate
fluctuations for these two countries.
Figure 3.4: Correlation Between Firm Specific Granular Residual and GDP Growth
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Notes: the figure plots the average of the correlation between per capita GDP growth and the contempo-
raneous rank-specific GR, with its one lag and two lags, respectively. The rank-specific GR corresponds
to rank specific weighted firm idiosyncratic shock.
The last piece of the puzzle remains as to why shocks diversify away in the case of the
UK and Canada but not in the US or Germany. We conjecture that granular e ects
in the US and Germany are driven by the fact that several top ranked firms in the US
and Germany belong to the Transportation Equipment sector (SIC37), which in both
16We compute the correlation between GDP growth and the contemporaneous rank-specific GR, with
its one lag and then two lags. In the end we plot the average of the three correlations against the rank’s
average sales to GDP ratio.
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countries represents an important component of output. With our data and methodology
we are only able to shed some light to this hypothesis. To do so, we first show a snapshot
of the top 10 firms and sectors as ranked by sales to GDP in year 2002 in Table 3.4 and
3.5, respectively. In both countries, 3 out of 10 firms belong to the SIC37, and this is the
top-ranked sector in both countries as well.17 Second, we construct two modified versions
of the GR (with year and year-industry demeaning) dropping the firms that belong to
each 2-digit industry one at the time. Figure 3.5 plots the volatility and correlation
between this modified GR and GDP growth for the US, Germany, the UK and Canada.
The horizontal line indicates the volatility ratio between the economy-wide GR and per
capita GDP growth, and the vertical line indicates the correlation between the two.
Table 3.4: Top 10 Firms, 2002
Canada Germany UK US
SIC2 S/Y SIC2 S/Y SIC2 S/Y SIC2 S/Y
1 36 2.45 37 7.28 20 3.09 53 2.16
2 36 2.45 37 4.22 10 2.54 37 1.73
3 54 2.23 99 4.14 28 2.35 37 1.60
4 48 1.96 99 3.33 53 2.32 99 1.24
5 37 1.95 53 2.36 48 2.24 73 0.85
6 54 1.94 48 2.30 48 2.02 21 0.72
7 33 1.76 37 1.83 28 2.01 48 0.66
8 37 1.54 33 1.81 54 1.68 42 0.65
9 36 1.40 42 1.59 20 1.26 37 0.57
10 48 1.29 28 1.55 21 1.12 48 0.52
Notes: the table reports the top 10 firms as ranked by sales in 2001, and the 2-digit sector they belong
to.
When demeaning by year (top panel of Figure 3.5), we see in the US that when firms
belonging to SIC37 are dropped the volatility and correlation of the GR in relation to GDP
growth becomes zero and negative, while dropping other sectors made relatively little
changes. We arrive at the same conclusion upon examining the results from demeaning
by year-industry for the US in the bottom panel of Figure 3.5. In the case of Germany,
17We redo this same exercise for the rest of the years and the same conclusions hold.
112
Table 3.5: Top 10 Sectors in 2002
Canada Germany
Rank SIC2 # Top
Firms
S/Y SIC2 # Top
Firms
S/Y
1 Elec. 5 6.47 Trans.Eq. 8 16.12
2 Food Strs. 5 5.34 Conglmrts. 3 7.52
3 Comm. 8 4.19 Chem. 14 6.82
4 Trans.Eq. 4 3.64 Comm. 5 3.59
5 Metal Ind. 7 2.57 G.Mechdis.Strs 2 2.59
6 G.Mechdis.Strs. 2 1.28 Metal Ind. 5 2.23
7 Chem. 5 1.16 Trans.Svcs 2 1.83
8 Paper and Allied 5 0.98 Machne.Eq. 14 1.60
9 Lumber 7 0.89 Motr.Warehsing. 1 1.59
10 Railroad Trans. 2 0.84 Whsl Tr. 4 1.30
UK US
Rank SIC2 # Top
Firms
S/Y SIC2 # Top
Firms
S/Y
1 Food Prd. 8 6.41 Trans.Eq. 8 5.09
2 Chem. 7 6.33 G.Mechdis.Strs 8 4.27
3 Comm. 7 5.88 Comm. 11 3.48
4 Food Strs. 5 3.76 Chem. 10 2.64
5 G.Mechdis.Strs 4 3.53 Food Strs. 6 1.71
6 MetalMining 2 3.10 Conglmrts. 2 1.63
7 Trans.Eq. 4 2.18 Food Prd. 7 1.60
8 Biz.Svcs. 6 1.74 Machne.Eq. 6 1.52
9 Whsl Tr. 3 1.51 Biz.Svcs. 4 1.52
10 Prntn.Pub. 4 1.44 Whsl Tr. 4 1.34
Notes: the table reports the top 10 sectors as ranked by sector sales of top 100 firms in 2001.
SIC37 also stands out along with SIC99 (nonclassified establishments, including industrial
conglomerates) among others when demeaning by year. However, dropping each of the
two sectors has the opposite e ect on the correlation between the GR and GDP growth.
When we demean by year-industry and so controlling for industry-wide shocks, SIC37
clearly stands out to be the one that dominates the negative correlation between the
GR and GDP since dropping it turns the correlation between the GR and GDP growth
positive (see bottom panel of Figure 3.5).18. Overall, idiosyncratic shocks at the firm level
18From the results in Section 3.3 we know the coe cient on the contemporaneous GR demeaning by
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in Germany do explain aggregate fluctuations with the e ects coming also mostly from
SIC37.
The overall message for Canada and the UK is mixed. When we demean by year or by
year-industry, we do see much more dispersion which may explain why the economy-wide
GR does not explain the year-to-year GDP fluctuations. Though there were sectors that
stand out in these countries, they are scattered around the near zero correlation between
the economy-wide GR and GDP growth counteracting each other’s contribution.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the importance of firm-level idiosyncratic shocks in explaining ag-
gregate fluctuations. It is motivated by the theoretical framework (Gabaix, 2011) that
shows in an economy with fat-tailed size distribution of firms, law of large numbers breaks
down and idiosyncratic shocks to firms diversify at a much milder rate and lead to non-
trivial e ects on aggregate fluctuations. In the data, firm level shocks are estimated as
the demeaned productivity growth rates, where the mean is calculated over top firms of
the year or of the year and industry. These shocks are then weighted by firms’ sales to
GDP ratio, and the empirical strategy tests whether the sum of these weighted shocks
statistically explains GDP fluctuations.
We find shocks to large firms are of little relevance in the UK or Canada but explain
roughly 1/3 of the output fluctuations in the US and Germany. While top ranking firms
contribute the most to granular e ects, they do not always sum up to play a significant
role in every country. We conclude that the reason they did not explain GDP growth in
the UK and Canada is because diversification is at work still in these two countries. In
the US and Germany, preliminary evidence suggest that the granular residual are driven
year-industry is negative when regressing this variable and its lags on per capita GDP growth in Germany.
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Figure 3.5: Volatility and Correlation Between Modified Granular Residual and Per
Capita GDP Growth
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by firms that belong to the transportation industry. Our results suggest that while firm
size distribution is found to be highly skewed in most economies, the ability of the largest
firms to transmit shocks is not universal. Other transmission mechanisms are at work,
and the importance of them di ers on a country-by-country basis.
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